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Abstract
A significant proportion of US households have insufficient savings to cope with
even moderate consumption shocks that can result in substantial externalities. At
the same time, the most financially fragile households have the highest level of lot-
tery expenditure as a proportion of income. A product which exploits the demand
for lottery tickets, a prize-linked savings account, could ‘nudge’ at-risk households
to save more. Prize-linked savings accounts offer individuals a savings product with
principal-security and the chance to win a lottery-type jackpot. Using an online
experiment, this thesis finds that the introduction of prize-linked savings accounts
significantly increases the total level of savings, and reduces lottery expenditures
and current consumption. The results imply that the introduction of prize-linked
savings is a plausible policy option to nudge savings in the right direction, and
improve welfare.
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1 Introduction
“How confident are you that you could come up with $2,000 if an un-
expected need arose within the next month?”
Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano (2011) asked 2,148 US residents this
question in an online survey. Half of respondents answered that they
would be unable to come up with the money. Approximately two-thirds
indicated that they did not have $2000 in the form of savings.1
Unlikely events occur all the time. Sometimes they are good things, like finding a
twenty dollar note on the street. Other times they are bad things, emergencies like
a car’s transmission breaking down, or a child or spouse falling ill. Economic theory
predicts that people, being generally risk-averse, would insure against uncertain,
adverse outcomes. Insurance against these small, unexpected consumption shocks
is most commonly expected to be found in the form of interest-bearing savings,
which have the advantage of liquidity. The findings of Lusardi, Schneider and
Tufano (2011), however, indicate that most Americans do not have $2000 safely
tucked away for a rainy day.2
At the same time, US households spend, on average, $540 per annum on lottery
tickets, compared with $430 spent, on average, per annum on dairy products. This
figure is relatively stable across income groups so that households with the lowest
incomes spend, proportionally, the greatest amount on lottery tickets (Kearney
et al., Forthcoming). Low-income households are also the least able to come up
with $2000 in the event of an emergency. Thus, rather than insuring against
unlikely adverse outcomes, the most financially fragile households purchase lottery
tickets, which provide a remote chance at a life-changing positive outcome.
The extreme financial fragility of the majority of US households, two-thirds of
whom do not have a $2000 buffer in case of an emergency, poses an externality on
society and results in a undesirable welfare outcome. A related study by Lusardi,
1Savings is defined as “otherwise inefficiently invested wealth that provides liquidity” (Morse,
2011).
2The $2000 figure was chosen because it is the cost of an unexpected home or car repair, or a
medical or legal expense.
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Schneider and Tufano (2010) finds that, in response to the current financial crisis,
Americans cut back on non-emergency medical coverage more than individuals
in countries with national health coverage, and that financial fragility was one
of the strongest predictors these cuts. At minimum, the high degree of financial
fragility is a cause of anxiety and stress. At worst, the inability to come up with
$2000 at short notice in response to an emergency could result in familial strife,
depression and bankruptcy. Low levels of savings, thus, are an undesirable welfare
outcome.
The negative welfare outcome and externalities associated with the high levels
of financial fragility of US households can be remedied with a number of policy
responses. Direct government action, however, in the form of mandated savings
or direct cash injections to increase liquidity is problematic. The former is likely
to be impractical as savings must be liquid to be effective consumption insurance.
Households who do not save will simply withdraw their savings, and any attempt
to limit withdrawals to genuine emergencies would lower liquidity and increase
red-tape. Furthermore, it is possible that savings mandates may be politically
impractical as such a policy may be viewed as paternalistic. Direct cash injections
are also unlikely to be effective as research has shown that cash injections to low-
income households simply increase current consumption (Adams, Einav and Levin,
2009; Stephens, 2003). Thus, a policy which encourages people to choose to save
more is considered.
This thesis explores the introduction of a novel financial product, which exploits
the broad appeal of lottery tickets to influence individuals’ choice to save. Prize-
linked savings (PLS) products are savings devices which, instead of an certain
interest payment, pool the interest payments of all investors and pay the total out
to one randomly chosen investor at regular intervals.3 PLS products are “no-lose
lotteries” as they guarantee principal-security. They have the appeal of lotteries, as
well as the additional savings appeal of liquidity, and principal-security. Evidence
from over 20 countries in which PLS products are offered shows that PLS products
are both profitable for public and private issuers, and appealing to savers (Kearney
3The jackpot prize for the longest running PLS product in the UK is £1 million pounds per
month.
2
et al., Forthcoming). PLS products present a choice for individuals, which is
designed to encourage saving.
The main hypothesis presented in this empirical thesis is that the introduction
of PLS products in an economy will increase the total level of savings. This hy-
pothesis is tested using an diverse online panel. The online panel allows for the
modelling of a simple economy where subjects are faced with an individual port-
folio allocation problem. Subjects are first presented with a series of decisions in
which they can allocate funds to current consumption, traditional savings or lot-
tery tickets subject to a budget constraint. Then they are presented with a similar
set of decisions with the option to allocate funds to the PLS product as well.
The effect of the introduction of PLS on the total level of savings can, thus, be
measured. Furthermore, the sources of PLS demand can be fully analysed using
the detailed individual-level information on allocations to current consumption,
traditional savings and lottery tickets which is not available in the field. Sourc-
ing PLS demand is of particular importance because if PLS demand is sourced
primarily from traditional savings then the externality exists and welfare is not
improved. However, if PLS demand is sourced primarily from current consumption
and lottery ticket expenditure, then the level of total savings increase and welfare
is improved.
This experiment shows that the introduction of the PLS significantly increases
total savings by 25 percent. In particular, total savings increase most amongst
subjects who report having no savings. Econometric analysis of the ‘dreaming
premium’ subjects pay when they buy lottery tickets with a large ($1000) jack-
pot payoff instead of investing in traditional savings shows a positive relationship
between the premium of dreaming and the likelihood of PLS take-up when it is
introduced. This suggests that PLS are considered to be an alternative to lotter-
ies. Examination of the sources of PLS demand show that current consumption
and lottery ticket expenditure decrease by 38 and 33 percent, respectively, whereas
traditional savings decline by only 20 percent. Thus, the total increase in the level
of savings is greater than the interest foregone by subjects when they invest in the
PLS. It is unambiguous that the change in the choice set caused by introduction
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of the PLS ‘nudges’4 individuals to save more money, on average.
This thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on PLS products,
the theoretical literature explaining the lottery ticket puzzle, and work on the
financial fragility of American households. Section 3 provides a full statement of
the hypotheses tested by the experiment. A key methodological contribution to
the experimental literature regarding the interaction between hypothetical payoffs
and incentivised payoffs, and sample-selection is discussed here. Section 4 details
the motivation behind the design of the experiment and presents key details of the
experimental procedure. Sections 5 & 6 provide an overview of the results of the
experiment followed by a discussion of the results, their relation to the hypotheses
and contribution to the literature. Section 7 concludes.
4This term is borrowed from Thaler and Sunstein (2008). A ‘nudge’ is when a positive policy
outcome can be attained by altering individuals’ choice set, or the choice architecture they face,
without reliance on mandates, or other such mechanisms.
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2 Literature review
2.1 Prize-linked savings
PLS products have been largely unstudied by scholars despite their widespread
availability and long history. Academic work in this area focuses on the history
and appeal of such products, and uses macroeconomic data to study the sources
of their demand. The focus of most empirical work is on British Premium Bonds,
which are the longest-running PLS program currently in existence.
2.1.1 Overview
The structure of PLS products is almost identical across financial institutions –
they are offered as a kind of deposit account (when offered by private institutions)
or as an alternative government-backed bond which bear little or no interest and
instead provide investors with a randomised return in the form of cash or in-kind
prizes, whilst maintaining principal-security and liquidity. They are offered in over
20 countries5 and have been available since the 1694 ‘Million Adventure’ in the
United Kingdom (Kearney et al., Forthcoming; Murphy, 2005).
2.1.2 Appeal
Kearney et al. (Forthcoming) identify the key aspects of PLS products which
appeal to savers and issuers. Savers are drawn to PLS because of the skewness
of its return, that is, PLS provides investors with exposure to upside-risk without
exposure to potential losses, and due to the element of entertainment or ‘fun’
associated with lotteries. For institutions issuing PLS products, they are often
found to be more profitable than traditional savings products as they have lower
costs of marketing and production due to public familiarity with lotteries, and
because they may be invested into relatively simple investments compared to other
financial market products such as mutual funds. Moreover, salient prizes can be
5Including in Australia: http://www.boq.com.au/save_to_win/default.htm
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created and maintained by simply altering the odds and underlying interest rate
over time. This also allows issuers to maintain liquidity as prize-eligibility can
be denied to those making withdrawals. The experience of Latin American banks
indicates that the cost of raising funds through PLS is between one-half and two-
thirds of that of regular savings accounts, suggesting that PLS accounts are a viable
source of revenue for the banks that offer them (Guillén and Tschoegl, 2002).
Kearney et al. draw an important link between lottery gambling, its prevalence
amongst low-income households in the US and low savings rates amongst these
households, and point to PLS products as a possible policy response to this phe-
nomenon. In 2008, 42 states and the District of Colombia offered state lotter-
ies which collectively raised $60 billion in sales, or more than $540 per house-
hold, despite a negative expected return of $0.52 per dollar. Astonishingly, in
2008, average household expenditure on lottery tickets exceeded expenditure on
dairy ($430) and alcohol ($444). Furthermore, lottery gambling is prevalent across
several socio-economic characteristics, especially race, sex, income and education
groups. Average annual lottery spending is constant across income groups, thus
low-income individuals proportionally have the highest lottery expenditure. These
stylised facts lead Kearney et al. to hypothesise that there is unmet demand in the
US for saving products which offer the, albeit small, possibility of changing current
wealth status, rather than incrementally building wealth with certainty.
The introduction of PLS products to the US could fill a ‘missing market’ for the 50
percent of households unable to cope with a consumption shock of $2000(Lusardi,
Schneider and Tufano, 2011; Kearney et al., Forthcoming). Currently, the market
for emergency savings is limited to interest-bearing savings accounts. Over an
uncertain horizon of several months or years, compound interest does not provide
a compelling reason to save. PLS allows savers to maintain liquidity and principal
certainty, while providing a chance to win a large prize, at the cost of a small
interest payment (Kearney et al., Forthcoming). In particular, the skewness of
PLS returns means that individuals receive the opportunity to enter a higher
wealth, and social, class, whilst maintaining their current wealth levels. Limited
data from the introduction of a PLS program in South Africa, which attracted
$US201 million of funds from 1.1 million individuals, many of whom had never
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had bank accounts before, supports their hypothesis. This hypothesis is tested in
this study.
2.1.3 Empirical studies of Premium Bonds
Premium Bonds (PBs) have been offered to British savers continuously since 1956,
and were introduced to combat inflation and finance British WWII debt obliga-
tions. PBs are widespread in Britain with 23 million PB holders investing more
than £33 billion. PB holders are given chances to win tax-exempt prizes ranging
from £50 to £1 million. The odds of winning a prize in September 2006 were
approximately 24,000 to 1.6 Major empirical studies on PBs have been conducted
by Lobe and Hölzl (2007), and Tufano (2008).
Lobe and Hölzl (2007) consider the risk attitudes of PB holders, and test whether
these risk attitudes determine PB demand. Lobe and Hölzl estimate the risk
tolerance of an investor who is indifferent between PBs and a risk-free investment.
They find indifference risk coefficients which are close to risk neutrality, especially
in recent years, and are relatively stable. Across tax brackets, they find that PB
holders in the lowest tax bracket are either risk neutral or slightly risk-seeking,
and high-income taxpayers with a slight degree of risk aversion also invest in
PBs. They conclude that PBs are not considered risky because investors retain
principal-security, and there are no other participation fees other than foregone
interest.
Where Lobe and Hölzl frame PB demand in terms of risk attitudes, Tufano (2008)
aims to determine whether the savings aspect, the lottery aspect, or the hybridi-
sation of the two causes demand for PLS. This is done via time series analysis
of correlations between net PB sales (i.e. sales less redemptions), gambling ac-
tivity and traditional savings activity, for the period 1987-2006.7 Tufano finds
that net PB sales are significantly and positively correlated with gambling activity
and positively correlated changes in savings at a level approaching significance. A
6Further information can be found at http://www.nsandi.com/savings-premium-bonds.
7Traditional savings are measured using M4 (household fixed income holdings including saving
accounts, and term deposits) less cash-at-home and checking accounts. Gambling activity is
measured using a time series of general, pool and bingo betting, and National Lottery sales.
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significant and positive correlation between gambling and savings is also found.
However, the correlations of the first differences of these series are not significantly
different from zero, which suggests that the time series examined are complements,
or correlated with a common macroeconomic factor such as wealth but otherwise
independent. Tufano concludes that investors consider PBs to be a hybrid product
with a clear savings element.
Lobe and Hölzl (2007), and Tufano (2008) provide valuable insights into the char-
acteristics of PB holders, and the determinants of PLS demand. However, further
study is needed to determine whether individuals’ risk attitudes, or preference
between savings and gambling cause demand for PLS products, which are ques-
tions which cannot be dealt with adequately with macroeconomic data. In an
experimental-setting with a simplified model economy it may be possible to deter-
mine the links between risk attitudes and demand for PLS products, and, through
a study of the comparative statics following introduction of PLS products, whether
this demand derives from savings, lottery expenditure, new investments, or some
combination of all three.
2.1.4 A US field study
The two PB studies analyse PLS demand in an economy with an established, well-
known PLS program. Tufano, De Neve and Maynard (2011), on the other hand,
provides an equally important contribution to the literature as the only field study
conducted on the introduction of PLS products in a developed economy without
previous experience of such a product. Tufano, De Neve and Maynard study the
launch of the first US PLS product in 2007 by Centra Credit Union in Indiana. A
survey conducted in Clarksville, Indiana accompanying the launch is the primary
data source. The survey was conducted at a local Wal-Mart and 547 customers
provided demographic information and answered the question:
Would you be interested in a savings account that awarded chances
to win prizes based on the amount of money you save? The account
would also have no fees, no minimum balance, and still earn interest.
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A majority said that the concept appealed to them. A regression analysis of stated
interest using explanatory variables reflecting demographics and socio-economic
characteristics found that PLS appealed more to non-savers, who were 70 percent
more likely to state interest. Participants with assets between $1 and $2000 showed
2.5 times greater interest in the PLS compared to those with over $50,000 of assets.
In addition, those who spent over $100 in the past six months on lottery and
gambling activity showed interest levels 2.9 times higher than those who spent less
than $100. Optimistic participants (who possibly overestimated their chance of
winning) showed 2.1 times more interest than those who foresaw no change in their
income over the coming five years, consistent with the behavioural research of Puri
and Robinson (2007). However, other demographic factors were insignificant.
Tufano, De Neve and Maynard (2011) is an important contribution to the litera-
ture as it is the first to examine the introduction of the PLS with microeconomic
data. The results suggest a high degree of heterogeneity in PLS demand. It is
an important first step in determining the demographic sources of PLS demand.
Nonetheless, more study is needed to determine the financial sources of PLS de-
mand and to answer pertinent questions: Do people save more when the PLS is
introduced? Do they buy fewer lottery tickets? Do people make new investments
when the PLS is introduced? Such issues are critical to the question of increasing
savings rates, and the implications of PLS introduction.
2.2 The lottery ticket puzzle
The stylised fact that consumers purchase both lottery tickets and insurance prod-
ucts, displaying at once risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviour, is a long-standing
puzzle for economists. Multiple solutions have been offered, including the seminal
work by Friedman and Savage (1948), yet no single, coherent theoretical expla-
nation of this phenomenon exists. Any attempt to offer such an explanation is
beyond the scope of this empirical study. However, notable explanations for this
puzzle are considered in order to meaningfully interpret and explain the nature
and sources of demand for PLS products in this study. This is because PLS prod-
ucts borrow the key salient feature of lotteries – a risky chance to win a large,
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life-changing prize – to appeal to consumers.
Expected utility theory provides a coherent theoretical framework within which
subjects attitudes towards risk can be tested. Key microeconomic studies of risk
preferences provide evidence for risk-aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005; Ander-
sen et al., 2008; DellaVigna, 2009) which further confounds the puzzle. Generally,
risk-aversion under expected utility predicts a preference for the safe certainty of
compound interest over the extreme uncertainty of lottery tickets. This theoret-
ical prediction stands at odds with the stylised facts of low savings levels, and a
high level of lottery ticket sales in the US (Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano, 2011;
Kearney et al., Forthcoming).
Despite the inconsistency of observed risk-aversion with expected utility’s theo-
retical predictions, lottery demand can be explained by assuming individuals buy
lottery tickets because they are ‘fun’. That is, when people consider purchasing
lottery tickets they do not consider them as solely financial gambles, in which case
a risk-neutral person would maximise her expected value and save the money in-
stead, but instead as hybrid consumption-financial products. The motivation for
buying lottery tickets is then to receive a ‘utility from dreaming’ which is suffi-
cient to offset the loss in expected return relative to savings, or other safer financial
products.
Formal expected utility models which incorporate this utility of dreaming are ex-
tremely rare in the literature. In the only model of additive expected utility
available in the literature (Oster, 2002), individuals maximise utility over ticket
purchases (n), where
U = (1−(1−p)n) ·u(J+X−n)+(1−p)n ·u(X−n)+EUs,n+V (J,X, λ), if n > 0,
and if n = 0, U = u(X), where n is the number of tickets, u(·) is a concave utility
function, u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0, J is the jackpot, X is the individual’s wealth, p is the
probability of winning, EUs,n is the expected utility of winning smaller prizes when
n tickets are bought and λ is a free parameter capturing heterogeneity in feeling
about the lottery. Thus, λ is the parameter capturing the ‘dreaming premium’ an
individual pays to buy a lottery ticket. Thus, the utility of buying no tickets is the
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utility of current wealth, whereas the utility of purchasing n tickets is the expected
utility of the tickets plus the utility of dreaming associated with the lottery (the
V (·) function). V (·) is assumed to be increasing in jackpot size, J , decreasing in
wealth, X, and increasing in λ. Expected utility theory can, therefore, explain
demand for lottery tickets when they are taken to have some sort of consumption
element, like the utility from dreaming. Moreover, Oster’s model is an extremely
valuable contribution to the literature as the only model to specify the utility of
dreaming.
Even though expected utility can explain the demand for lottery tickets, alterna-
tive behavioural theories provide richer descriptions or explanations for the de-
mand for lottery tickets. They can be divided into two categories: rank-dependent
expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1982) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992) which rely on subjective probability weighting to show that
individuals overweight the small objective probabilities of winning a lottery jack-
pot; and, theories which rely on the idea that individuals aim to move out of
their current wealth ranking, in comparison to others, and so invest in products
with a small entry fee and an opportunity to win a large, risky payoff (Shefrin
and Statman, 2000; Hopkins, 2011). The latter explanation is often referred to as
skewness – the small chance to win a large, life-changing prize – which is cited
as an appealing feature of PLS products (Kearney et al., Forthcoming; Tufano,
De Neve and Maynard, 2011; Tufano, 2008).
2.2.1 Probability weighting
Quiggin’s (1982) rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) model extends von
Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) expected utility theory. In RDEU, a subjective
probability weight is attached to any prospect which not only depends on the
objective probability of the prospect but also on its ranking relative to the other
outcomes of the prospect. The probability weighting function, pi(pi), which is a
transformation on cumulative probabilities such that
∑
i∈N pi(pi) = 1, reflects the
subjective view of risky prospects which then enter the value function, V (.). In
addition, there are distinct decision weights, wi = pi(pi), where it is not necessary
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Figure 2.1: RDEU probability weighting function
π(p)
1
1p0
that wi = wj even if pi = pj, which allows the weight attached to the conse-
quence to vary according to how subjectively ‘good’ or ‘bad’ it is. The inverted-S
form presented in Figure 2.1 of the probability weighting function proposed by
Quiggin (1982) reflects subjective probability, pi(p), associated with the objective
probability, p, whereby lower-ranked outcomes will be overweighted relative to
higher-ranked outcomes. Thus, remote outcomes such as the possibility of win-
ning a lottery jackpot are systemically overweighted. This provides a coherent
explanation for lottery ticket demand by risk-averse individuals.
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT), is an alterna-
tive to expected utility which incorporates Quiggin’s probability weighting func-
tion.8 In CPT outcomes are interpreted as gains and losses relative to a reference
point, such as status quo wealth. Gains and losses are evaluated using a value func-
tion which is concave for gains and convex for losses, and steeper in the domain of
8Tversky and Kahneman (1992) conduct laboratory experiments to elicit the shape of the prob-
ability weighting function. Their findings are consistent with the S-shaped function proposed
by Quiggin (1982).
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Figure 2.2: CPT value function
losses Figure 2.2. This functional form implies that agents exhibit diminishing sen-
sitivity and loss aversion. Diminishing sensitivity holds that psychological impact
of a change relative to a reference point decreases as it moves further away from
a reference point. This is analogous to diminishing marginal utility for gains, and
diminishing marginal disutility for losses. Loss aversion is the principle that “losses
loom larger than corresponding gains” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
CPT incorporates the RDEU probability weighting function so that risky prospects
are evaluated with reference to a weighting function that underweights large and
overweights small probabilities. The S-shaped function is used because a value
function with the property of diminishing sensitivity will be steepest around the
reference point, and, if the end points of the probability scale provide natural
reference points, diminishing sensitivity implies a probability weighting function
which is steep near zero and one but relatively flat around the middle.
Both RDEU and CPT provide a coherent theoretical explanation why normally
risk-averse agents purchase lottery tickets – they overweight the probability of
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winning the lottery jackpot. Given that PLS shares the salient feature of a jackpot
prize, this can explain PLS demand. Moreover, the principle of loss aversion in
CPT provides a further basis for PLS demand. As principal investments in PLS
are safe and liquid, nominal deposits are not ‘lost’ in the same way as money paid
for a losing lottery ticket is. PLS products, thus, guarantee loss-aversion.
2.2.2 Skewness
An early approach to explaining the demand for lottery tickets was developed by
Friedman and Savage (1948), who attempted to explain why agents simultane-
ously exhibit risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviour. This is represented using an
S-shaped utility function (Figure 2.3), which is concave for lower wealth levels, as
agents are risk-averse in the neighbourhood of their current wealth level, and con-
vex for higher wealth levels, as agents may be risk-seeking with respect to prospects
which may take them into a higher wealth, and therefore social, class. This can
explain why people buy insurance contracts to maintain their current wealth level,
but also purchase lottery tickets to move up to a higher wealth level.
This model has been extended by several researchers (Flemming, 1969; Kim, 1973;
Ng, 1975; Crossley, Low and Smith, 2011) to argue that since agents’ budget
sets are discontinuous, either due to large indivisible expenditures such as univer-
sity tuition, or due to imperfect credit markets, lottery tickets are purchased to
‘convexify’ agents’ budget sets. However, a number of important objections to
the Friedman-Savage model have been made (Machina, 1982; Quiggin, 1991); the
most important one is that the individuals’ observed gambling behaviour does not
change radically in response to changes in their initial wealth, which is consistent
with the stylised facts about gambling in the US reported by Kearney et al. (Forth-
coming). The Friedman-Savage utility function, however, implies that behaviour
will be highly sensitive to changes in initial wealth, with only individuals near the
inflexion points displaying propensities to both gamble and insure.
The Friedman-Savage utility function remains an extremely important contribu-
tion despite flaws to its functional form. It is useful for identifying an important
reason for the demand for lottery tickets – skewness or the desire to ‘get rich, quick’
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Figure 2.3: Friedman-Savage utility function
(Kearney et al., Forthcoming; Tufano, 2008). The utility of moving up the social
ladder is the basis of two differing theories – Hopkins’ (2011) model of inequality
and risk-taking behaviour, and Shefrin and Statman’s (2000) behavioural portfolio
theory – which explain the demand for lottery tickets and PLS.
Hopkins (2011) develops a model of social competition (i.e. tournament) which
determines how a range of ranked rewards or status positions are allocated. He
finds that if the value of the minimum status approaches zero, the lowest-ranked
in society will be risk-seeking, even if they have substantial wealth. Intuitively,
low social status or exclusion leads to desperation, which gives an incentive to
gamble. Thus, the prospect of low status, independent of the aﬄuence of society,
determines risk-taking.
Hopkins’ model provides a theoretical mechanism to link the apparent empirical
relationship between inequality and risk-taking behaviour, which is consistent with
the stylised facts reported by Kearney et al. (Forthcoming). According to Hopkins’
model, low-ranked households and individuals fear outcomes which will maintain
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their low-rank. This fear causes desperation, which in turn leads to risk-seeking
behaviour to avoid low-rank outcomes, and seek outcomes which could improve
their social ranking. This risk-seeking behaviour may range from engagement in
criminal activities (in particularly dire cases) or, more usually, higher expenditure
on lottery tickets as a proportion of income. By a similar logic, the highest level
of demand for PLS products should be from low-income individuals.
Behavioural portfolio theory (BPT) (Shefrin and Statman, 2000) considers the
decision to invest in savings accounts, or lottery tickets in terms of a portfolio
of several mental accounts. BPT portfolios resemble layered pyramids, where
layers are associated with aspirations. In a simple two-layer portfolio there is
a low aspiration layer designed to avoid poverty (e.g. savings in the form of
Treasury bonds) and a high aspiration ‘for a shot at riches’ (e.g. lottery tickets).
Moreover, Shefrin and Statman cite British premium bonds as an optimal single
investment for low-income individuals, as they combine low- and high-aspiration
outcomes.
Skewness can thus explain the demand for lottery tickets. Individuals purchase
lottery tickets because they derive some utility from ‘a shot at the riches’. PLS
products share the feature of a large jackpot prize with lottery tickets and, thus,
skewness explains the appeal of PLS.
2.3 Welfare implications
US households spend, on average, $540 per annum on lottery tickets, which indi-
cates a high level of demand for financial products offering the remote chance to
win a large, life-changing outcome. The findings of Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano
(2011) indicate, however, that whilst US households demand financial products
with a large, uncertain payoff, there is a strikingly low level of insurance against
transitory consumption shocks amongst US households. In an online survey 2,148
US residents were asked, “How confident are you that you could come up with
$2000 if an unexpected need arose within the next month?” 50 percent of respon-
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dents answered that they would not able to come up with $2000.9 This suggests
that half of American households are extremely financially fragile in the face of a
‘routine’ emergency. In particular, two-thirds of respondents in the lowest income
bracket reported themselves as being unable to come up with $2000. Econometric
analysis shows that these findings are robust across a range of socio-economic char-
acteristics, although the unemployed, those who have suffered large wealth losses,
and families with children are more likely to report being unable to cope with a
$2000 shock. This finding is broadly consistent with other surveys, such as the 2007
Survey of Consumer Finances, which showed that 42 percent of Americans has less
that $2000 in savings accounts.10 Moreover, a study by Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008) finds that unpredictable consumption shocks far exceeding $2000
are quite common, which suggests that Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano’s findings
underestimate the level of financial fragility in the US. As such, Lusardi, Schnei-
der and Tufano’s study is an extremely important and relevant contribution to the
literature.
The fact that the majority of American households are extremely financially frag-
ile, with more than half of respondents indicating that they do not have the savings
to weather a $2000 storm, poses an externality on society and results in an un-
desirable welfare outcome. Psychologically, the anxiety or pessimism associated
with a high degree of financial fragility could lower welfare. Low levels of savings
could also increase bankruptcies in a country which already has over 1.5 million
individual bankruptcies in a twelve month period.11 A related study by Lusardi,
Schneider and Tufano (2010) finds that, in response to the financial crisis of 2008,
Americans cut back on non-emergency medical expenditure more than residents in
countries with national health coverage. Controlling for wealth, income and other
economic indicators, their measure of financial fragility was one of the strongest
predictors of the likelihood that a household would cut its non-emergency health-
care expenditure. Although more research is needed in this area, it is suggestive
9Of the 50 percent who responded that they could come up with the $2000, only 60 percent
named savings as the source of the $2000. This indicates that two-thirds of respondents did not
have $2000 of savings.
10This survey was conducted before the 2008 recession.
11US Courts data for the 12-month period ending 31 March, 2011 (http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/0910_f2.pdf).
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of the externalities, or negative welfare outcomes of financial fragility, and low-
savings. Low levels of savings and associated high levels of financial fragility thus
pose a major issue for policymakers as they result in externalities which reduce
overall welfare.
In order to address this negative policy outcome, governments could regulate, or
mandate savings requirements. However, the enforcement of such a policy would
be problematic given that emergency savings must be liquid, and easily accessi-
ble, and therefore savings could be withdrawn even when there is no consumption
shock. A possibly more effective method of increasing savings levels is the in-
troduction of PLS, which has two advantages over government mandated savings
requirements. First, PLS products are easy to market and explain to individuals,
and easy to understand because they borrow their salient features from lottery
tickets and offer principal security. This is particularly relevant since Lusardi,
Schneider and Tufano (2011) find a correlation between low levels of financial
literacy and high levels of financial fragility. Second, savings mandates may be
viewed with resistance by households and groups who view it as a form of gov-
ernment paternalism.12 The availability of PLS products from the private sector
could ‘nudge’ households towards saving more by changing their choice architec-
ture. The framing of choices and the setting of default options has been shown to
have an affect on households’ decisions, and the availability of PLS products could
encourage savings (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Atalay, 2011). Thus, PLS products
are a viable potential policy response to the financial fragility and low-savings rates
of American households.13
2.4 Summary
The literature on PLS products has largely focussed on their appeal and history.
Empirical studies of PBs have contributed to the literature by addressing ques-
12Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano (2011) also find that those with higher levels of financial fragility
were found to have negative attitudes towards regulation.
13State lotteries, which are used to fund services like education, generally have a monopoly on
lotteries. This has been a legal barrier to PLS products in the US. To implement PLS state
lottery laws may need to be relaxed.
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tions of PLS appeal and demand using aggregate data. However, they have been
unable to clearly determine the sources of PLS demand, or address the effect their
introduction has on savings levels due to a lack of detailed micro data. Proper
consideration of the sources of PLS demand and savings levels requires detailed in-
formation on households’ portfolio allocation to consumption, savings and lottery
ticket expenditures. Such datasets are not available in the field. An experiment,
however, allows for the construction of a model economy in which the effect of the
introduction of the PLS on individual portfolios can be studied. A priori hypothe-
ses regarding the effects and their policy implications are motivated by theoretical
and applied literature on the lottery ticket puzzle and low-savings levels in the
US.
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3 Hypothesis
It is assumed that before the PLS is introduced individuals,
maxUi(αCi, βSi, θLi) subject to α + β + θ = 1, (?)
where Ci is the amount individuals allocate to current consumption, Si is the
amount saved in traditional interest-bearing accounts, and Li is the amount spent
on lottery tickets. α, β and θ are the proportion of an individual’s portfolio allo-
cated to current consumption, traditional savings, and lottery tickets.
After the PLS is introduced individuals,
maxUi(α
∗Ci, β∗Si, θ∗Li, γ∗PLSi) subject to α∗ + β∗ + θ∗ + γ∗ = 1, (??)
where Ci, Si and Li are defined as in (?), and PLSi is the amount invested in the
PLS. α∗, β∗, θ∗ and γ∗ are the proportion of an individual’s portfolio allocated to
current consumption, traditional savings, lottery tickets, and PLS.
The theoretical considerations in the Literature Review motivate the following a
priori hypotheses regarding the introduction of the PLS –
H1 Current consumption will decrease, or remain constant: α∗ ≤ α.
The introduction of the PLS alters the choice set for individuals, who now
have the option of investing in a novel financial product which possesses the
salient features of lottery tickets, with the appeal of skewness, and traditional
savings, with liquidity and principal-security. Individuals will now reallocate
from current current consumption to PLS, thereby creating ‘new’ savings.
This captures a ‘missing markets’ for savings.
H2 Traditional savings levels will decrease, or remain constant: β∗ ≤ β.
Savers can now choose a savings product that offers skewness at the expense
of certain interest income. The desire to improve one’s social ranking and
wealth level will to some degree be greater than the appeal of compound
interest and thus, traditional interest-bearing savings will decrease.
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H3 Expenditure on lottery tickets will decrease, or remain constant: θ∗ ≤ θ.
The PLS borrows the key salient feature of lottery tickets – a large jackpot
payment. Individuals who derive a utility of dreaming from lottery tickets
now face a trade-off as they find that they can derive similar utility from the
PLS product. They may now buy lottery tickets, in which case the money
allocated to the lottery is ‘lost’ if they do not win the lottery jackpot, and
receive higher odds of winning the jackpot prize than if they invested in
the PLS, which offers principal-security but also lower odds of winning. It is
hypothesised skewness and loss-aversion cause individuals to reallocate funds
from the lottery to the PLS.
H4 Total savings will increase, or remain constant: β∗ + γ∗ ≥ β.
Current consumption, traditional savings and lottery expenditure are all
hypothesised to decrease when the PLS is introduced, with the amounts re-
allocated to the PLS. The increase in savings through the PLS, that is the
certain return from the PLS and traditional savings including interest, will
exceed the certain interest foregone when individuals reallocate funds from
traditional savings to the PLS. Thus, the level of total savings is increased
primarily through a reduction in current consumption and lottery ticket ex-
penditure.
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4 Design
To experimentally measure the effect of PLS on the level of total savings, and
the sources of PLS demand, it is necessary to recognise that individuals’ problem
before the PLS is introduced is essentially to maximise their utility by allocating
their portfolio to current consumption, lottery tickets, or traditional savings. The
introduction of the PLS alters individuals’ choice set. Individuals then maximise
their utility by allocating their portfolio to current consumption, lottery tickets,
traditional savings, or PLS. This is the problem described by (?) and (??) in the
Hypothesis section. Field data regarding individual portfolio allocation in this
context is not available. An experimental approach allows a simple economy in
which individuals face a portfolio allocation problem to be modelled.
A key feature and innovation of the experimental design presented below is its
non-standard subject panel, which was recruiting using the popular online services,
Study Response and MTurk. Student subjects are the standard for experimental
panels due to their convenience for academic researchers. Standard student pan-
els, however, are not ideal for a portfolio allocation experiment to determine the
level and sources of PLS demand. First, student subject panels are not generally
heterogenous in age, income, savings level, or education. Given the heterogeneity
in the characteristics of financially fragile households in the US, and their lev-
els of education and financial literacy (Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano, 2011) the
recruitment of a heterogenous, representative subject pool online confers many
advantages on such a study. Second, an online panel comprises of subjects of vary-
ing ages and higher levels of experience in managing a household portfolio. Thus,
decisions in the experiment are made by subjects more experienced in household
portfolio management than a standard student panel. Third, the relatively low
cost of online recruitment allows for the recruitment of a relatively large subject
panel (N = 562), which is generally unfeasible in lab experiments. Thus, this ex-
periment has the properties of both an artefactual field experiment (i.e. a relevant
population) and framed field experiment (i.e. relevant context), in the taxonomy
defined by Harrison and List (2004).
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4.1 Establishing an experimental framework
The choice between risky lottery tickets and safe interest-bearing savings reflects
peoples’ risk attitudes. Moreover, since interest payments and lottery jackpot pay-
ments are made after a delay, the decision to buy lottery tickets or save in the first
place, reflects peoples’ time preferences. Thus, studies of time and risk preference
elicitation form the basis for the experimental design presented below.
The elicitation of time preference and individual discounting rates, and risk prefer-
ences have been the subject of a large body of experimental literature. Discounting
studies, surveyed by Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002), have elicited
high discount rates, often in excess of 1000 percent. Any decision over time,
however, involves a degree of uncertainty and earlier estimates, while extremely
important from a methodological perspective, were biased upwards as they as-
sumed risk-neutrality (see Coller and Williams, 1999). Risk preference studies
have generally been conducted separately from time preference studies and their
findings support earlier findings of risk-aversion from micro-econometric studies
(Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005). Recognising this bias, and the intertwined nature
of time and risk preferences, recent studies by Andersen et al. (2008), Andreoni
and Sprenger (Forthcoming), and Laury et al. (2011) form an invaluable contribu-
tion to the literature as the three clear theoretical and methodological approaches
to joint elicitation of time and risk preferences.
Andreoni and Sprenger’s (Forthcoming) convex time budgeting (CTB) method to
jointly elicit time and risk preferences is, in particular, relevant to the portfolio
allocation context of this study. Using the CTB method, subjects are asked to
allocate a portfolio over two different payment dates, with money allocated to
later dates earning various rates of interest. The approach effectively imposes
a budget constraint with concave utility (i.e. risk-averse subjects). Therefore,
subjects maximise u(ct, ct+k) subject to the future-value budget constraint,
(1 + r)ct + ct+k = m, (4.1)
where ct is current consumption, ct+k is delayed consumption or savings, r is
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the interest rate and m is experimental endowment. This approach, therefore,
convexifies the multiple price list (Coller and Williams, 1999) approach in which
subjects are required to maximise their utility subject to the discrete future-value
budget set,
((1 + r)ct, ct+k) ∈ {(m, 0), (0,m)}. (4.2)
Implicit in this approach is the fact that the budget constraint (4.1) is non-binding
for risk-neutral subjects, for whom the corner-solutions consistent with the Coller
and Williams (1999) budget set, (4.2), are possible.
The CTB approach forms the basis for this experiment for two reasons. First,
the procedure is adaptable to a setting which involves portfolio allocation between
current consumption, savings, PLS, and risky lottery products with a jackpot
drawn in the future, along a continuum of choices, unlike multiple-price lists in
which subjects can only allocate ‘all or nothing’ to an option. The approach itself,
recognises the fundamental issues of time and risk preferences which, although not
the focus of this study, are an important issue to account for. Second, the principle
of constrained optimisation is the only theoretical assumption in this approach.
CTB is thus the most appropriate framework for this experiment.
4.2 Online subject panels
The subject panel recruited for this experiment uses the Study Response14 and
MTurk15 panels as a key feature of this experiment. The diversity of subjects in
these panels is considerably greater than that of any physical laboratory. This is
an advantage for a study measuring the levels and sources of PLS demand, with a
particular focus on low-savings households. Study Response and MTurk allow for
the easy recruitment of two experimental groups with different payment methods.
Study Response subjects (N = 113) are compensated using more standard exper-
imental payment methods. Approximately ten percent of subjects were randomly
14This service is found at http://www.studyresponse.net
15This service is found at http://mturk.amazon.com
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chosen at the end of the experiment to receive payment for one randomly chosen
decision made by them during the experiment. The remaining subjects a flat-fee
for participation. MTurk subjects (N = 449), on the other hand, all received
a $1.50 flat-fee for participation. This is a relatively high amount for a service
where subjects generally receive between $0.05 and $0.50 for each task they per-
form (Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011). MTurk subjects were informed that
they would only receive a flat-fee whereas Study Response subjects were informed
of the decision-payment method. This allows for a methodologically interesting
examination of the interaction between decisions made under different payment
schemes.
4.2.1 Study Response
Established as a unit of Syracuse University, Study Response recently became an
independent provider of subject panels for online academic studies. It is operated
as a traditional panel, which acts as an intermediary between researchers and
subjects.
Study Response has developed procedures to ensure simple recruitment of subjects,
and credible payment. Study Response maintains a large and representative panel
of subjects, and this allows for the simple recruitment of a large number of subjects
via email invitations. In addition, it is in Study Response’s interests to maintain
trust between researchers and subjects with regards to the use of their information,
and the credibility of payment. This is done by requiring Institutional Ethics Board
approval, and by enforcing a policy of double anonymity between researchers and
subjects to discourage collusion between subjects and the coercion of subjects
by researchers. Its requirement of prepayment of funds by researchers increases
the credibility of payment, and trust of subjects. This ensures a subject pool
which has trust in researchers’ motives and their ability to provide the promised
compensation.
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4.2.2 MTurk
MTurk is a service offered by Amazon.com and is primarily operated as an online
labour market where employers (‘requesters’) advertise ‘jobs’, known as human
intelligence tasks (‘HITs’), to be completed by workers. The purpose of MTurk
is to provide a platform where tasks, which cannot be computerised because they
require higher-order cognitive skills, can be advertised and completed quickly at
low cost. The tasks advertised range from simple data-cleaning tasks, to higher-
order tasks such as transcribing audio, with the associated payments ranging from
$0.01 for extremely simple tasks to over $5 for more advanced tasks.
An advantage of MTurk, and online experiments generally, is that they are often
easy to set-up. On MTurk an experiment is advertised as a HIT, which offers a
general description of the experiment which they can accept. Subjects can then
accept the HIT which takes them to the experiment.16 HITs are verified by pro-
viding subjects with a randomly generated ‘completion code’ at the end of the
experiment. If the codes generated by the experiment match the codes entered
by subjects on MTurk, then it is approved by the researcher and subjects are
paid.
MTurk has several features which promote trust between researchers and subjects.
Like Study Response, all interactions with subjects are anonymous, which prevents
coercion of subjects by researchers. Protocols to prevent collusion amongst sub-
jects, and, more importantly, to stop subjects from completing the study multiple
times are also in place. Subjects are not allowed to have more than one account,
and CAPTCHA verification17 is used to ensure that the experiment is completed
by humans. The likelihood of multiple computerised attempts by the same subject
is also lower for one-shot experiments, like this experiment, since the cost of creat-
ing an algorithm to complete the experiment outweighs the potential gain (Horton,
Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011). Furthermore, subjects have an incentive to complete
experiments honestly because, if they are rejected, their ‘HIT acceptance score’
decreases, which could preclude them from completing HITs which require high
16This experiment was created and externally-hosted on http://www.qualtrics.com
17This is an acronym based on the word ‘capture’ and stands for ‘Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart’.
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acceptance scores. Researchers also have an incentive to act honestly as fraudu-
lent behaviour by researchers can be reported to Amazon.com. The requirement
to place all payable funds in escrow with Amazon.com before the experiment is
advertised increases subjects’ trust in receiving payment. Finally, researchers can
specify a number of conditions such as a 90 or 95 percent HIT approval rating, or
US residency. This allows them to recruit a subject pool with a higher likelihood
of honestly completing the study, and the desired demographic characteristics.
These features allow MTurk to act as a clearinghouse where both researchers and
subjects have trust in each other.
4.2.3 Advantages and concerns
An online panel has several advantages over a standard laboratory study. First,
there is high degree of heterogeneity in an online subject panel compared with a
lab study. Online panels allow researchers studying issues of public policy, which
require a more diverse population than a standard student panel, to recruit a
diverse population relatively easily and at low cost. In this study, recruitment
from online panels resulted in a subject sample which is also more experienced at
household portfolio allocation decisions than a standard student panel. Second,
the experience of an online experiment for later reviewers is exactly the same as the
subjects’.18 Third, replication is easy and nearly identical to the original study
as all that is required to set up the study is an internet connection (Garbarino
and Slonim, 2009). Fourth, online experiments have been shown to be externally
valid. Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser (2011) find that the results of a common
loss-gains experiment, prisoners’ dilemma game and dictator game using MTurk
are consistent laboratory studies. In addition, studies by Garbarino and Slonim
(2006, 2009) using a Study Response panel have found results regarding gender
differences in preferences which are similar to laboratory studies.
There are three concerns associated with online experiments. First, there is a
18This experiment can be accessed at http://econusyd.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_
cD4Kd9LjaSdJbNO (Study Response group 1); http://econusyd.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=
SV_0OsFuzJ5PtPVQxe (Study Response group 2); http://econusyd.qualtrics.com/SE/
?SID=SV_5mXophbcOhYrPfK (MTurk).
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possibility of lower trust between subjects and researchers, which could poten-
tially bias the results. If subjects do not trust researchers to make payments,
their response to experimental payoffs may change. Steps were taken to increase
trust amongst all subjects in this experiment. When the study was advertised
on MTurk using the Participant Information Statement, and researchers’ contact
details. In addition, MTurk’s rules regarding payment encouraged trust amongst
workers. Study Response subjects were also sent the Participation Information
Statement in their invitation email. The long engagement of these subjects with
Study Response encouraged levels of trust amongst Study Response subjects. All
subjects were encouraged to contact researchers with any questions regarding the
experiment, or payment. All Participant Information Statements, and experimen-
tal websites were branded with University of Sydney insignia to encourage trust
amongst subjects. Moreover, a comparison of the level of trust in payments be-
tween Harvard Decision Sciences Laboratory subjects (which prohibits deception)
and MTurk subjects using a 7-point Likert scale found that the mean level of trust
was similar amongst both groups. The difference in the mean level of trust was
0.19 standard deviations, which represents a modest difference in trust levels. In
addition, the highest trust response was modal for both groups (Horton, Rand and
Zeckhauser, 2011). Second, there is a loss of control relative to the lab as subjects
could be distracted during the experiment, or multitasking, amongst other things.
To control for this subjects were timed as they completed the experiment and
asked a comprehension question. As detailed below, only nine subjects failed the
comprehension question. Finally, relative to a lab study, there is a concern that
subjects may not comprehend what they are doing. The experiment was designed
to ensure comprehension at all stages, and all instructions were kept as brief and
concise as possible and visual aids were included to enhance comprehension. These
are addressed further below.
4.2.4 Differing payment procedures
The experiments for the MTurk and Study Response groups were identical – this
includes all text, graphics, formatting, and decisions and parameters – except for
details regarding payment. Subjects in the MTurk group completed the experi-
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ment with hypothetical payoffs in exchange for a $1.50 flat fee.19 Study Response
subjects, on the other hand, were faced with monetary incentives for their deci-
sions. Each subject was informed that she had a one-in-ten chance of receiving
payment for one randomly-selected decision she makes, and a nine-in-ten chance
of receiving a flat-fee. This is an extremely common experimental payment proce-
dure, utilised notably by Andersen et al. (2008). The studies by Horton, Rand and
Zeckhauser (2011) for MTurk, and Garbarino and Slonim (2006, 2009) for Study
Response suggest that there should be no significant difference in the results de-
rived between the Study Response and MTurk groups. This hypothesis will be
tested by this experiment. Thus, this thesis provides an important methodological
contribution to the experimental literature by exploring the interaction between
hypothetical and incentivised payoff mechanisms.
The Study Response group is further divided into $8 and $12 flat-fee subgroups.
The $8 or $12 flat-fee was clearly mentioned in the invitation email sent to subjects.
Subjects in either group had no knowledge of the other group and received exactly
the same experiment except for details regarding the fixed-fee. The subgroups
were formed to test whether there was a sample-selection bias between them, with
a potential higher representation of lower-savings subjects in the $8 subgroup
compared with the $12 subgroup. If there is a sample-selection bias between
subgroups this thesis could provide an insight into the nature and extent of these
biases (Slonim et al., 2011).
4.3 The experiment
The experiment was conducted online in two waves: the first wave was conducted
using MTurk from 16 to 18 August 2011; the second wave was conducted us-
ing Study Response from 29 August to 7 September 2011. The experiment was
identical in both waves.20
19This fee is considered high for MTurk (Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011).
20This experiment can be accessed at http://econusyd.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_
cD4Kd9LjaSdJbNO (Study Response $8 group); http://econusyd.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=
SV_0OsFuzJ5PtPVQxe (Study Response $12 group); http://econusyd.qualtrics.com/SE/
?SID=SV_5mXophbcOhYrPfK (MTurk).
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4.3.1 Portfolio allocation in three stages
The experiment was designed to model households’ portfolio allocation problem
in a simple economy where it is only possible to allocate a portfolio to current
consumption, traditional savings, and lottery tickets. This is done by constructing
a three-stage experiment where subjects are presented with a $100 present-value
budget set to allocate to a combination of the early allocation, traditional savings,
lottery tickets and the PLS. Thus, the effect the introduction of the PLS has on
the level of total savings in this economy, and the sources of PLS demand can be
analysed.
The first stage was designed to introduce subjects to the portfolio allocation setting
by eliciting preferences over only savings or lottery. It consisted of six decisions
– three decisions over current consumption and lottery tickets, and then three
decisions over current consumption and savings. All three lottery decisions were
presented first, and then the savings decisions were presented. The nature of both
decisions was explained to subjects using text, visual aids, and examples. Each
decision was made over different lottery and savings parameters. For the lottery
the parameter was the odds of winning a $1000 lottery jackpot, and the three odds
were determined with reference to early payment. Thus, the subjects were offered
odds with,
• an expected value better than early payment – i.e. an expected value of $1.10
for every $1 worth of lottery tickets bought,
• an expected value equal to early payment – i.e. an expected value of $1,
• an expected value worse than early payment – i.e. an expected value of
$0.90.
The odds per dollar were thus 0.11 percent (‘good’), 0.10 percent (‘fair’), and 0.09
percent (‘bad’). To communicate the odds of winning clearly, the budget set was
discretised into intervals of $20, so that subjects’ allocations to each option were
limited to {$0, $20, $40, $60, $80, $100} subject to the $100 budget constraint.21
21This also made equal allocation to all options impossible for subjects, thereby forcing them
to reveal a preference for either current consumption, or a form of later payment. In the first
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The odds are summarised in Table 4.1. For savings, the parameter was the 10-
week interest rate, which was used instead of the annual interest rate for simplicity.
The interest rates offered were 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent. Finally, it was
made clear to subjects that both the lottery (and later PLS) $1000 jackpot payment
and interest payment will be made on the same date, so that time preferences do
not affect decisions between savings and lottery tickets. Thus, the first stage sets
up subjects for complex decisions later on.
Table 4.1: Lottery odds
Allocation ($) 0 20 40 60 80 100
Good odds 0 2.2 4.4 6.6 8.8 11
Fair odds 0 2 4 6 8 10
Bad odds 0 1.8 3.6 5.4 7.2 9
Odds were presented as an “x percent chance of
winning the lottery jackpot.”
In the second stage subjects were asked to make two sets of decisions – nine deci-
sions over current consumption, savings and lottery tickets, and nine decisions over
only later payment in the form of savings and lottery tickets. Thus, a 3 × 3 × 2
design was employed, where all savings and lottery parameters were interacted,
and then interacted with the presence of the early payment option. Instructions
and examples were again shown before both sets of decisions. The first set of nine
decisions including the early payment option were presented first in order of in-
creasing interest rate, with good lottery odds interacted first, then fair, and then
bad. The purpose of these decisions was to replicate the options available to con-
sumers before the introduction of the PLS, and elicit preferences for each option.
The second set of decisions were shown in the same order, and the purpose of those
decisions was to elicit preferences over savings and lottery to measure the ‘dream-
ing premium’ paid to obtain the utility of dreaming from lottery tickets.
The third, and last, stage introduces the PLS and involved 15 decisions over early
stage subjects could not split current : later into $50 : $50. In the second stage they could
not split current : savings : lottery into $33.33 : $33.33 : $33.33. In the third stage they could
not split current : savings : lottery : PLS into $25 : $25 : $25 : $25.
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payment, savings, lottery tickets and the PLS product. The savings and lottery
parameters were interacted with PLS parameters. The PLS parameter was the
odds of winning the $1000 PLS jackpot, which were selected to be ‘good’, ‘fair’,
‘bad’ with reference to the savings option, since it is designed as a substitute for
savings. For the fair PLS odds,
EVPLS = 1 + r,
where EVPLS = 1 + J · pPLS,
∴ 1 + J · pPLS = 1 + r,
pPLS =
r
J
.
where EVPLS is the expected return of investing in the PLS, r is the certain interest
return of investing in traditional savings, J is the PLS jackpot prize and pPLS is
the probability, or odds, of winning the PLS jackpot. Since the PLS guarantees
principal security, for every dollar invested, EVPLS = 1+J ·pPLS. Thus, pPLS > rJ
for good PLS odds, and pPLS < rJ for the bad PLS odds. Not all interactions were
included in order to keep the experiment at a manageable length. Dominated
interactions for the 5 percent and 20 percent interest rates were excluded, but all
interactions were included for the 10 percent interest rate. This yielded the final
set of interactions summarised in Table 4.2.
This design allows for the measurement of demand for savings, lottery, and PLS
products and allows for the measurement of fixed-effects within-subjects to es-
timate the effects of the introduction of PLS on portfolio allocation of current
consumption, traditional savings and lottery tickets.
4.3.2 Ensuring internal validity
In order to ensure internal validity, it was important to ensure the experimental
instructions were easy-to-understand. Unlike laboratory experiments, it was not
possible to include long and detailed instructions as there was no guarantee that
subjects would read them, and it was expected that as the length of instructions
increased, the number of completed responses would decrease. Thus, simple, clear
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Table 4.2: Experimental conditions after the introduction of the PLS
PLS odds† Good Fair Bad
— 5 percent interest —
Good lottery odds 0.0055 - -
Fair lottery odds - 0.005 -
Bad lottery odds - - 0.0045
— 10 percent interest —
Good lottery odds 0.011 0.010 0.009
Fair lottery odds 0.011 0.010 0.009
Bad lottery odds 0.011 0.010 0.009
— 20 percent interest —
Good lottery odds 0.022 - -
Fair lottery odds - 0.020 -
Bad lottery odds - - 0.018
† Odds are expressed as percentage chance of
winning the PLS jackpot per dollar invested.
and direct instructions were required. The experimental design assisted in this
respect as the complexity of decisions increased progressively, and thus, once the
relatively simple early decisions were explained subjects learned to adapt to the
introduction of more products. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the de-
cisions was consistent with the experimental aim of considering the effect of the
introduction of the PLS into a model economy. Visual aids (.gif computer anima-
tions) were produced which explained the nature of the decisions using simplified
representations, such as a piggy bank for savings, and a spinning prize-wheel for
the lottery set along a timeline to illustrate the nature of the decision. Finally, in
order to ensure that subjects seriously attempted the experiment, a question was
included in the demographic survey section to filter out subjects not attempting
the experiment seriously22 –
22Haipeng “Allan” Chen (Mays Business School, Texas A&M University) provided the idea for
this question at his seminar on the use of MTurk for academic experiments delivered at the
University of Sydney Business School on 27 June 2011.
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How many fatal heart attacks have you suffered while completing this
experiment?
◦ Between one and three.
◦ Between four and six.
◦ Between seven and nine.
• None of the above.
Only nine respondents, that is, two percent, answered this question incorrectly.
All nine subjects completed the experiment despite their medical condition.
Internal validity also requires a transparent and trustworthy payment procedure
which equalised transaction costs. Some of the key steps taken to ensure a trans-
parent and trustworthy payment procedure was outlined in Section 2, above. An
advantage of online experiments is that, since all payments were made in the form
of Amazon.com gift cards,23 the transaction costs of early payment versus later
payment are equalised. A one-week front-end delay for early payment was imple-
mented for practical reasons (to determine the exact amounts subjects are to be
paid) and to avoid present-bias.
Figure 4.1: The Jackpot Index
Dow Jones Index NASDAQ Index S&P 100 Index
XX XX XX
XX are the last two digits of the adjusted closing values of
these indices on 1 November 2011.
A key concern was the design of a trustworthy and independently verifiable system
to determine the payment of the lottery and PLS jackpots. A jackpot index based
on publicly-available information was designed so that subjects could check the
outcome of the draws themselves. The jackpot index (Figure 4.1) was comprised
of the last two digits of the adjusted closing values of the Dow Jones, NASDAQ,
23Subjects elected to receive payment in this way by registering with either MTurk or Study
Response.
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and S&P 100 indices on 1 November 2011.24 Financial indices were used because,
although the general direction of their movement may be predicted, the last two
digits of their closing values are essentially random, and when combined with the
last two digits of another financial index, the jackpot index is effectively a random
number.
Subjects were provided with web addresses to http://www.google.com/finance
to check these values, and informed that these values are reported in any reputable
news outlet. Moreover, the subjects who were randomly selected for payment for a
decision were emailed a PDF receipt which included details about the jackpot index
and a randomly generated range of prize numbers based on the odds of winning
associated with their decision. They were informed about the PDF receipt during
the experiment.
In order to assess the internal validity of the experiment, the decisions of the
first stage can be analysed to check whether subjects’ responses to higher lottery
odds, and higher interest rates are rational. Simple ordinary least-squares (OLS)
regressions of the following form were run,
Yi = α + β
′X+ σ′S+ i,
where Yi is the allocation to either lottery or savings, X is a vector containing the
price variable indicators – fair lottery odds and good lottery odds for the lottery
and 10 percent interest rate and 20 percent interest rate for savings – where bad
lottery odds and 5 percent interest rate were taken as the base cases for lottery
and savings, respectively. S is a matrix of subjects-specific indicator variables
included to account for fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by subject
were calculated.
Table 4.3 shows that the expenditure on lottery tickets increases, on average, as
the odds of winning the lottery jackpot improves. Table 4.4 shows that the level
of traditional savings increases as the interest rate increases. These results are
robust across experimental group. Thus, the rational response to an increase in the
24The day was chosen so that it is easy to remember for subjects, and so that it is close to the
later payment date.
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Table 4.3: Lottery expenditure behaviour
(1) (2) (3)
All subjects MTurk Study Response
Fair lottery odds 6.121∗∗∗ 6.592∗∗∗ 4.248
(0.000) (0.000) (0.155)
Good lottery odds 11.99∗∗∗ 13.45∗∗∗ 6.195∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027)
Observations 1686 1347 339
Subjects 562 449 113
Adjusted R2 0.682 0.675 0.702
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.4: Savings behaviour
(1) (2) (3)
All subjects MTurk Study Response
10% interest rate 13.74∗∗∗ 14.88∗∗∗ 9.204∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
20% interest rate 30.78∗∗∗ 33.27∗∗∗ 20.88∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1686 1347 339
Subjects 562 449 113
Adjusted R2 0.636 0.622 0.727
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
return for both financial products indicates that the results from the experiment
are internally valid. Moreover, rational responses to increased expected returns
are present in all estimates presented in the Results section.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
The full set of characteristics is presented in Appendix A. There is a high degree of
heterogeneity within the sample. Subjects are divided into the MTurk and Study
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Response groups. One of the key characteristics consistent with Lusardi, Schnei-
der and Tufano’s (2011) study is that 65 percent of participants reported savings
of less that $2000. There are some key differences between these groups – MTurk
subjects are generally younger and less educated, whereas more Study Response
subjects are employed full-time, have a higher level of weekly expenditure, and
report higher levels of savings. The Study Response group is further divided into
the $8 and $12 flat-fee subgroups. There are no major differences between these
subgroups’ characteristics and therefore, in the Results section, Study Response
subjects are generally treated as one group. Further analysis on the interaction
between payment methods and sample-selection are conducted in the Results sec-
tion.
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5 Results
The aim of this study is to empirically determine the effect of the introduction
of PLS products on total savings levels, and, in particular, the effect on individ-
uals with less than $2000 of reported savings. This econometric analysis leads
to the conclusion that the introduction of PLS products has a statistically- and
economically-significant effect on the level of total savings for all subjects, and
low-savings subjects especially. Having ascertained the strong positive effect that
the introduction of PLS products has on total savings, the effect of the introduc-
tion on allocations to current consumption, traditional savings, and lottery tickets
is studied in order to determine the source of increased savings. Reductions in
current consumption and lottery expenditure are found to be the largest sources
of PLS demand. Finally, the ‘dreaming premium’ is calculated to determine the
price paid by subjects to dream of winning the lottery jackpot. Regression re-
sults indicate that there is a positive relationship between this premium and the
probability of investing in a PLS product, which shows that there exists demand
for PLS products amongst those subjects who purchase higher amounts of lottery
tickets.
5.1 Total savings analysis
Examining the mean level allocated to total savings, that is traditional interest-
bearing savings plus PLS, Figure 5.1 shows that across all subjects, total savings
increase substantially from $48 to $60, or by 25 percent after the introduction of
the PLS. Most importantly, for subjects with reported savings of $0 (13 percent
of subjects) mean total savings increased by 40 percent, and for subjects with
reported savings of less than $2000 (65 percent of subjects) mean total savings
increased by approximately 27 percent. Mean total savings increase by approx-
imately 27 percent for subjects in the MTurk group and a 20 percent increase
amongst Study Response subjects. Analysis presented below shows that this dif-
ference is largely caused by heterogeneity between experimental groups, not the
different payment schemes used for each group. Within the Study Response group,
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Figure 5.1: Mean total savings – before and after PLS introduction
$0.00 
$10.00 
$20.00 
$30.00 
$40.00 
$50.00 
$60.00 
$70.00 
All 
Reported 
savings    
= $0 
Reported 
savings                   
< $2000 
Reported 
savings                  
> $2000 
MTurk Study Response 
Study 
Response 
($8 
group) 
Study 
Response 
($12 
group) 
Before $48.09 $40.56 $43.23 $57.36 $48.22 $47.57 $48.42 $46.71 
After $60.33 $56.89 $54.92 $70.67 $61.18 $56.92 $58.43 $55.38 
Percent increase 25% 40% 27% 23% 27% 20% 21% 19% 
in the $8 group mean total savings increased by 21 percent whereas mean total
savings increased by 19 percent in the $12 group. This difference was not found
to be significant.
5.1.1 Fixed-effects estimation
The data used to analyse the effect of PLS introduction uses all decisions made
by subjects in the second stage (allocating $100 between current consumption,
savings, and lottery tickets) and the third stage (allocating $100 between current
consumption, savings, lottery tickets and PLS) of the experiment. For each of the
562 subjects there are thus 24 decisions, 9 before the PLS was introduced and
15 after, so that N = 13, 488. Given the panel nature of the data, the primary
method of analysis involves estimating regression estimates which account for the
fixed-effect within-subjects. Fixed-effects are incorporated using the least-squares
dummy variable approach, whereby subject-specific dummy variables are included
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in the analysis. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported.
In order to determine the effect of the PLS introduction on the level of total savings
regressions of the following form were estimated,
TSi = α + δPi + β
′X+ σ′S+ i. (5.1)
TSi = PLSi + Traditional Savingsi, represents the level of total savings. Pi is
a variable indicating which is equal to one when the PLS is introduced. X is a
vector containing the price variable indicators – fair PLS odds and good PLS odds,
fair lottery odds and good lottery odds, and 10 percent interest rate and 20 percent
interest rate – where bad PLS odds, bad lottery odds and 5 percent interest rate
were taken as the base case. S is a matrix of subject-specific indicator variables
included to account for fixed-effects.
One econometric issue is that the budget constraint limits the allocation to all
assets between $0 and $100. This issue is common to most studies of household
portfolio allocation and can be addressed in a number of ways detailed by Rosen
and Wu (2004). Here a two-limit tobit estimator with truncation at $0 and $100
was estimated to account for corner solutions made by subjects. Moreover, an
OLS estimator was chosen for its parsimony, as it displayed results consistent with
Figure 5.1, and because of its high explanatory power. The OLS and tobit estima-
tors determine the magnitude of the PLS introduction effect, and the magnitude
of the response to the price variables.
As total savings is an ordinal limited dependant variable which can only take values
of {$0, $20, . . . , $100}, a more efficient estimator is an ordered probit regression of
the following form,
Pr(TSi = 0|Z) = Φ(−γ′Z)
Pr(TSi = 20|Z) = Φ(µ1 − γ′Z)− Φ(−γ′Z)
... (5.2)
Pr(TSi = 80|Z) = Φ(µ5 − γ′Z)− Φ(µ4 − γ′Z)
Pr(TSi = 100|Z) = 1− Φ(µ5 − γ′Z),
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where Z is the vector of covariates expressed more fully in (5.1), Φ is the cumu-
lative distribution of a standard normal random variable, and µ1, . . . , µ5 are the
thresholds of the latent variable, TSi. Percentage marginal effects, which show the
effect of a discrete change in the dummy variable on the probability of attaining
that outcome, at the $0 and $100 outcomes are presented. Parameter estimates
for the ordered probit regression are also presented.
The introduction of PLS increases total savings, on average, by $12.24, as in Fig-
ure 5.1 (Table 5.1, Column (1)). Thus, the introduction of PLS has a statistically-
and economically-significantly increases on the level of total savings. Column (2)
suggests that subjects are not discerning between the different PLS odds, which
indicates that it is the availability of PLS products, and not their expected return
relative to lottery or traditional savings, which encourages saving. The estimation
of the full price vector, X, shows that, as expected, when lottery odds improve25
the level of total savings decrease, and that when the interest rate increases the
level of total savings increases. In this specification the coefficient for Good PLS
odds is positive and significant, which indicates that the presence of a PLS product
with a greater expected return than traditional interest savings increases total sav-
ings. However, this is only a small increase – approximately only about 8 percent
of the PLS introduction effect.
The tobit estimation truncates the data for subjects who allocate $0 or $100 to
total savings, and shows a greater increase in total savings due to the introduction
of the PLS. As expected, the coefficients for the price variables share the same
signs as those in the OLS, but have higher magnitudes as it truncates decisions
where the subjects did not save at all, or saved all of their portfolio.26
The ordered probit estimates are qualitatively similar to the OLS and tobit esti-
mates. The last two columns of Table 5.1 show the marginal effects for the discrete
changes of the indicator variables at the values $0 and $100. When the level of
total savings is $0, the introduction of the PLS reduces the likelihood that $0 will
be saved instead of $20 by approximately 9 percent. This implies that the in-
25Recall that good lottery odds have a higher expected return than allocating money to current
consumption.
26A similar magnitude effect was studied by Baba (1990).
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troduction of PLS induces savings amongst subjects who did not previously save.
The marginal effects for the price vector show that as PLS odds improve subjects
are less likely to save nothing, as lottery odds improve they are approximately 2
percent more likely to save nothing and they are approximately 13 percent less
likely to save nothing when there is a 20 percent interest rate. Furthermore, the
introduction of the PLS increases the likelihood that subjects save $100 by 10 per-
cent. As expected, when the PLS odds improve, subjects are slightly more likely
to save $100, when lottery odds improve they are less likely to save $100 and when
the interest rate is 20 percent they are approximately 15 percent more likely to
save $100.
5.1.2 Group and demographic analysis
MTurk subjects were compensated using a flat-fee system with subjects receiving
a $1.50 fee for completing the experiment. Study Response subjects, on the other
hand, were compensated using a common experimental procedure, most notably
employed by Andersen et al. (2008), whereby approximately 10 percent of subjects
were randomly chosen to receive payment based on one randomly-chosen decision
they had made with the possibility of winning the $1000 lottery or PLS jackpots,
and the remaining subjects received a flat-fee. This raises issues of differential
responses to the PLS introduction between the MTurk and Study Response group.
In order to analyse this issue, the OLS and tobit regressions of the following form
were estimated,27
TSi = α + δPi + φSRi + β
′X+ i, (5.3)
where SRi is a variable indicating whether a subject is in the Study Response
group (SRi = 1) or not (SRi = 0). TSi, Pi, X are defined as in (5.1), above.
Due to the time-invariant nature of SRi the fixed-effects variable, S, was dropped.
Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported.
27Ordered probit estimates yielded qualitatively similar results, and were thus not reported.
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Table 5.2: Comparing MTurk and Study Response groups’ savings behaviour
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
OLS xi × SRi Tobit† xi × SRi
Study Response subject 5.548 13.42∗
(0.119) (0.033)
PLS introduced 9.047∗∗∗ 3.689 14.10∗∗∗ 9.022∗
(0.000) (0.104) (0.000) (0.026)
Fair PLS odds -0.600 0.585 -1.304 1.320
(0.495) (0.562) (0.427) (0.482)
Good PLS odds 1.652 -0.838 2.386 -0.712
(0.054) (0.416) (0.123) (0.706)
Fair lottery odds -0.00492 -0.893 -0.706 -1.455
(0.996) (0.408) (0.698) (0.473)
Good lottery odds -2.094 -0.854 -4.068 -2.139
(0.077) (0.521) (0.060) (0.383)
10% interest rate 3.182 13.50∗∗∗ 5.086 25.80∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000)
20% interest rate 6.726∗∗ 6.819∗∗∗ 10.92∗ 12.97∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.001) (0.011) (0.000)
Constant 39.42∗∗∗ 32.33∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 13488 13488
Subjects 562 562
Adjusted R2 0.056
Adjusted R2 0.008
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Values truncated at $0 and $100. Marginal effects reported.
Table 5.2 indicates that Study Response subjects exhibit savings behaviour signif-
icantly different from MTurk subjects in the tobit specification, saving $13 more
than MTurk respondents on average.28 Importantly, Study Response subjects
28The difference between groups is approaching significance at the 10% level for the OLS es-
timator and, thus, significance in the tobit specification may be due to the fact that corner
solutions at $0 and $100 are accounted for.
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with decision payment exhibit a stronger response to the introduction of PLS than
MTurk respondents, saving approximately $9 more. Study Response subjects also
display a stronger preference for savings when the interest rate improves than
MTurk respondents, which may be a function of the decision payment method.
Therefore, it is possible to argue that Study Response subjects display differential
savings behaviour which may, in part, be a result of the decision payment system.
However, the payment procedure is not the only difference between groups – there
are differences in the demographic characteristics as well (Appendix A). When
the regression equations account for these differences in demographic character-
istics (Table 5.3), then there is no significant difference between Study Response
and MTurk subjects. Thus, it is possible to conclude that any difference between
the experimental groups reported in Table 5.2 is caused by heterogeneity between
groups, which is otherwise captured by demographic characteristics.
To ascertain the effect of heterogeneity on savings behaviour, the following regres-
sion equation was estimated,
TSi = α + δPi + φSRi + β
′X+ ϕ′D+ θ′PiD+ i, (5.4)
where D is the vector of demographic characteristics, PiD is the interaction of
demographic characteristics and the PLS introduction variable, and the remaining
variables are defined as in (5.3). Selected demographic characteristics, which are
significant at the 10 percent level, are presented in Table 5.3.29 Robust standard
errors clustered by subject are reported.
In the full sample demographic analysis presented in Table 5.3 the coefficient for
Study Response subject is not found to be statistically significant. This suggests
that the inclusion of demographic characteristics explain variation in total sav-
ings behaviour which was captured by the Study Response indicator variable in
Table 5.2. Male subjects exhibit a lower propensity to save generally; they are ap-
proximately 4 percent less likely to save $100 compared with $80. This is consistent
with the finding that men are generally less risk-averse than women, and thus more
likely to invest in the lottery, and given the binding $100 budget constraint, this
29The estimates for all demographic variables are presented in Appendix B.
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implies lower levels of savings amongst men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). A highly-
significant negative relationship is found between reported expenditure on lottery
or lottery-type products and total savings, however, it is a small relationship as a
$100 increase in purchases of lottery-tickets, or similar products, decreases total
savings by less than $0.51 in the OLS specification. A highly-significant positive
relationship was found between reported bank savings and total savings; a $1000
increase in reported in reported savings increased the total allocated to savings by
approximately $2 in the tobit, or 2 percent of the budget set.
Analysis of the interaction terms shows that PLS introduction had a statistically-
significant effect on the savings behaviour of US born subjects, employed subjects,
and those who expressed an interest in the PLS in the demographic survey after
the experiment.30
US born subjects exhibited a higher propensity to save when the PLS was intro-
duced compared with the 7 percent of non-US born subjects. One of the primary
motivations of this study is to analyse the effects of the introduction of the PLS
in the US, where it is novel and unknown. Thus, the response of subjects who are
less likely to have experience with PLS products (subjects born in the USA) is of
interest.31 The interaction term shows that US-born residents, on average, save
$14 more in the tobit than US residents born overseas when the PLS is introduced.
This provides some evidence to suggest that PLS products are appealing to US
citizens who are offered a novel new savings account. PLS introduction has nega-
tive effect on employed subjects (69 percent of the sample) compared to subjects
who were neither employed nor in the labour force. It is possible that due to their
steady income stream employed subjects do not need to insure against consump-
tion shocks as much as subjects without a steady income stream. Subjects with
higher levels of weekly expenditure on items other than essential expenditures such
as housing, healthcare and food were found to save less in response to the PLS
introduction; this effect is small, as subjects spending $100 a week in the form of
non-essential have only a 0.8 percent lower probability of saving $100. Finally, sub-
30Subjects were asked “Would you invest money in a prize-linked savings (PLS) product if a
financial institution offered it?” 12 percent responded that they would.
31Kearney et al. (Forthcoming) notes that PLS products are widely available in many economies
outside the US but are virtually unheard of within the US.
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jects who expressed interest in an actual PLS product after the experiment were
found to have saved approximately $11 more, which is close to 100 percent of the
PLS introduction effect in Table 5.1, than those who did not express interest.
5.1.3 Analysis of savings available to subjects
To fully test hypothesis H4 it is necessary to analyse whether the certain return
from savings increases after the introduction of the PLS. An example illustrates
the policy relevance of this analysis: a subject saved $100 at 20 percent interest
before the PLS and received $120 in ten weeks; after the introduction of the PLS
she reallocates $20 from traditional savings to PLS and receives $116 for certain
in ten weeks, having foregone $4 of certain interest return. Thus, the introduction
of the PLS actually decreases the amount of savings available to her in the future,
and does not improve her welfare. Therefore, it is important to assess whether
the amount of savings available to subjects in the future increase due to the PLS
introduction.
The following regression equation was estimated to analyse the effect of the PLS
introduction,
T˜ Si = α + δPi + β
′X+ σ′S+ i,
where T˜ Si = PLSi+(1+r)×Traditional Savingsi is the certain amount of savings
available to subjects in ten weeks and the right-hand side is identical to (5.1).
As above, OLS and tobit estimators with fixed-effects and robust standard errors
clustered by subject are reported.32
The results of the estimation presented in Table 5.4 show that the certain amount
of savings available to subjects in ten weeks also increases by approximately 20
percent (Column (1)). These results are consistent with those presented in Fig-
ure 5.1 and Table 5.1. However, unlike the estimates in Table 5.1, the PLS odds
do not have a statistically-significant effect on savings, which suggests that the
PLS introduction alone increases the level of savings available in future. As above,
32As it includes interest return, T˜ Si more closely resembles a continuous variable which makes
the ordered probit an inappropriate estimator.
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Table 5.4: The effect of PLS introduction on total savings available
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS Tobit†
PLS introduced 10.98∗∗∗ 11.38∗∗∗ 11.33∗∗∗ 13.23∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fair PLS odds -0.602 -0.268 -0.354
(0.199) (0.567) (0.517)
Good PLS odds -0.576 0.685 0.901
(0.295) (0.194) (0.138)
Fair lottery odds -0.833 -0.878
(0.076) (0.111)
Good lottery odds -3.154∗∗∗ -3.521∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
10% interest rate 11.50∗∗∗ 13.29∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
20% interest rate 26.66∗∗∗ 30.23∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean savings before PLS? 54.24 54.24 54.24 51.55
Observations 13488 13488 13488 13488
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.563 0.618
Pseudo R2 0.107
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Marginal effects reported.
? For tobit, the mean level of savings reported is if $0 < Total Savings < $120.
subjects display rational responses to higher lottery odds and interest rates. Thus,
on average, PLS introduction increases the total level of savings available to sub-
jects in the future, suggesting that PLS could be a policy response which improves
welfare.
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5.2 Sourcing PLS demand
Having established that the introduction of the PLS product increases savings,
econometric analysis to determine the sources of PLS demand is conducted. This
is done by analysing subjects’ portfolio allocation decisions along current consump-
tion, traditional interest-bearing savings and the lottery, and the effect of the PLS
introduction on these allocations. As above, ordered probit regressions are used
to analyse the marginal effects the introduction of the PLS on the probability of
subjects switching their allocation to current consumption, traditional savings or
lottery tickets from $80 to $100. Tobit regressions are used to determine the mag-
nitude of the PLS introduction effect. Hypotheses H1 – H3 are tested in this
way.
In order to analyse the effect of the PLS introduction on current consumption,
savings and lottery, regressions of the following form were estimated,
Yi = α + δPi + β
′X+ σ′S+ i, (5.5)
where Yi is the dollar amount allocated to current consumption, savings, or lot-
tery, and the right-hand side is defined as in (5.1). The ordered probit regression
equation is identical to (5.2).33 The marginal effects of the tobit and ordered
probit estimator are presented in Table 5.5. OLS estimates are presented in Ta-
ble B.2.
33There is the issue of joint estimation as the error terms across allocation equations are likely to
be correlated since the allocations are made simultaneously. Generally a more efficient estima-
tion technique is to jointly estimate all three equations as a “seemingly unrelated regression”
(SUR). Joint SUR estimation with OLS is a straight-forward process, but is computationally
complex for two-limit tobit and ordered probit estimators, while accounting for fixed-effects and
calculating robust standard errors clustered by subject. Convergence for the tobit and ordered
probit SUR estimator was not possible to attain within reasonable time-frames. Moreover,
since the right-hand side is identical for all three equations OLS SUR estimation cannot yield
more efficient results than separately estimating all three equations (see Wooldridge (2001),
Chapter 7; Cameron and Trivedi (2010), Chapter 5). Thus, given that tobit and ordered probit
SUR estimator could not be computed and the SUR and non-SUR OLS estimates are equally
efficient, simple tobit and ordered probit estimates accounting for fixed-effects with robust
standard errors clustered by subject are reported. A very similar issue was encountered by
Rosen and Wu (2004) in their estimation of portfolio share equations. In their case as well,
simple tobit estimates were presented.
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There is an observed decrease in current consumption, traditional savings and lot-
tery ticket expenditure, which indicates that the introduction of the PLS has the
effect of decreasing the demand of all of these ‘products’. Current consumption
and lottery ticket expenditure both decline by approximately $17 and $11, respec-
tively, whereas traditional savings, declines by only $9. The results for the ordered
probit are qualitatively similar for current consumption and savings allocations of
$100; subjects are 3.8 and 3.4 percent less likely to allocate $100 to current con-
sumption and traditional savings, implying that the introduction of PLS lowers
the allocations to current consumption and traditional savings. However, none of
the variables are shown to have a significant effect on lottery allocations of $100 in
the ordered probit. Proportional to the means reported in Table 5.5, allocations to
traditional savings decline by only 20 percent compared with current consumption
and lottery expenditure, which decreased by 38 percent and 33 percent, respec-
tively. Thus, as hypothesised, a greater proportion of the demand for PLS is
sourced from current consumption and lottery ticket expenditure.
In order to determine whether the PLS was perceived to be a complement or
substitute the response of subjects when the PLS price changes is examined. The
PLS price indicators, Fair PLS odds and Good PLS odds with Bad PLS odds taken
as the base case, show that subjects find the introduction of PLS sufficient to delay
their consumption by ten weeks and save more, as the price variables do not elicit
a response significantly different from zero for current consumption. Thus, when
subjects’ choice set is altered with the introduction of the PLS, they are ‘nudged’
towards saving more regardless of the return of the PLS product. When the odds
of winning the $1000 PLS jackpot are good, subjects reallocate an additional $4
(or 29 percent of the pre-PLS mean) from traditional savings to PLS and lottery
ticket expenditure decreases by 40 percent relative to the pre-PLS mean. This
indicates that PLS is considered an alternative to savings and investment.
5.3 The dreaming premium
The stylised fact that many consumers purchase lottery tickets with a negative
expected return presents a puzzle for economic theory. There is no coherent ex-
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planation for why normally risk-averse agents purchase these lottery tickets in
preference to savings with a certain expected return. In the absence of a clear
solution to this puzzle, it is assumed that consumers derive some utility associ-
ated with dreaming of winning a large jackpot. This compensates for the negative
expected return of the lottery relative to savings. In this study, it is possible to
construct the dreaming premium that subjects are willing to pay to gain utility
from dreaming of winning the lottery jackpot.
The dreaming premium variable is constructed from 7 decisions made by subject
between traditional savings and lottery tickets, only, before the PLS was intro-
duced or mentioned in the experiment at all.34 As the lottery jackpot and savings
allocation with interest payments were made on the same date, these decisions do
not depend on subjects’ time preferences. The variable is defined as,
PDi =
1
7
7∑
j=1
Li,j((1 + rj)− EVL,j
100(1 + rj)
,
where rj and EVL,j are the interest rate and lottery expected value for decision j
and Li,j is the amount spent on lottery tickets by subject i in decision j. Thus, the
dreaming premium, PDi is the interest return given up to purchase lottery tickets
with lower expected value for subject i, averaged over 7 decisions. The variable
is then normalised relative to the maximum dreaming premium, PD, for which
Li,j = 100 ∀j,
P˜Di = 100%× PDi
PD
.
P˜Di is thus a lower-bound on subjects’ true dreaming premium, as it is the most
subjects could have paid, but it is not necessarily the most they would have paid
to dream. The modal dreaming premium is 0 percent, and the mean dreaming
premium is 25.34 percent. The kernel density plot of this normalised variable is
shown in Figure 5.2.
34This is the second half of the second stage of the experiment. In this section, the interest
rate and lottery odds were interacted (3 × 3). However, for one decision the expected value
of the lottery (10 percent) was greater than the interest return (5 percent), and for another
the expected value of the lottery and the interest rate were equal (10 percent) so they were
omitted from this calculation. Thus, the variable is constructed from a set of decisions out of
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Figure 5.2: The dreaming premium – kernel density plot
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The constructed variable can be used to analyse the attitude of demographics and
experimental groups towards lottery tickets. Regressions of the following form
were conducted,
P˜Di = α + φSRi + ϕ
′D+ i,
where the covariates are defined as in (5.4). As P˜Di is a continuous variable, an
OLS regression was conducted. To account for 117 subjects who had no dreaming
premium and 11 subjects who had a 100 percent dreaming premium, a two-limit
tobit with truncation at 0 and 100 was estimated. The OLS coefficients and tobit
marginal effects significant at the 10 percent level are presented in Table 5.6. The
full table of covariates is found in Appendix B.
Subjects’ dreaming premium behaviour is found to mirror their savings behaviour
the main sample considered. (1 + rj) > EVL,j for all decisions.
54
Table 5.6: Subject characteristics and the dreaming premium
(1) (2)
OLS Tobit†
Study Response subject 7.506∗ 8.429∗
(0.018) (0.029)
Born in the USA -8.270∗ -9.774
(0.049) (0.061)
Employed 5.486∗ 7.316∗
(Omitted: Unemployed/NiLF) (0.013) (0.010)
Expressed interest in PLS 10.71∗∗ 12.85∗∗
(0.003) (0.001)
Lottery expenditure 5.731∗∗∗ 7.662∗∗∗
($ 00s) (0.000) (0.000)
Reported savings -0.577∗∗∗ -0.891∗∗∗
($ 000s) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 25.27∗ 23.97
(0.029) (0.098)
Observations 562 562
Adjusted R2 0.116
Pseudo R2 0.023
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Values truncated at 0 and 100. Marginal effects reported.
presented in Table 5.3. For example, the Study Response experimental group had,
on average, a 7.5 percent higher dreaming premium in the OLS, at the same time
Study Response subjects were found to save less, on average. Subjects born in
the USA had, on average, a 8 percent lower dreaming premium in the OLS, but
were found to save $4 more, on average. Employed subjects’ dreaming premium
is approximately 7 percent higher, in the tobit, and they were found to save ap-
proximately $8 less. As expected, there is a positive relationship between reported
lottery expenditure and the dreaming premium; given the mean dreaming pre-
mium is 25 percent, a $100 increase in lottery expenditure increases the dreaming
premium by approximately 8 percent, which is a substantial increase. There is a
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also statistically-significant negative relationship between reported savings and the
cost of dreaming; this is substantial as subjects with $30,000 in savings have, on
average, a dreaming premium 17 percent lower than those with no savings, under
the OLS specification.
Whether subjects Expressed interest in PLS product is also of interest. This vari-
able is equal to one if, at the end of the experiment, subjects answered ‘Yes’
when asked whether they would be interested in investing in a PLS product if
it was offered by a local financial institution. 11 percent of subjects, answered
‘Yes’ and the tobit specification shows that they bore a cost of dreaming approxi-
mately 13 percent higher than those who did not answer ‘Yes’. This is both highly
statistically- and economically-significant, as it suggests that PLS take-up may be
higher amongst persons who find lottery-type products appealing.
A probit regression is used to model the probability of PLS take-up in the last
stage of the experiment, when the PLS is introduced,
Pr(PLSi = 1|P˜Di) = Φ(βP˜Di),
where Φ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal random variable, and
PLSi is a variable which indicates participation into the PLS in the third stage
of the experiment. The marginal effects of this regression at the mean cost of
dreaming are presented in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Relationship between PLS participation and the dreaming premium
(1)
Probit
Average dreaming 1.473∗∗∗
premium (0.000)
Observations 562
Pseudo R2 0.044
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 ∗∗ p < 0.01 ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Percentage marginal effects
at means reported.
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The predicted probabilities are derived and plotted against the dreaming premium.
This is presented in Figure 5.3. In interpreting the scatterplot it is important to
recall that the dreaming premium is derived from a set of decisions between lottery
tickets and traditional savings, before any mention of the PLS. As such, it is derived
independently of the PLS participation variable, PLSi.
First, PLS take-up is high at 60 percent even when the subjects had no dreaming
premium. Second, PLS take-up as the dreaming premium increases, so that sub-
jects with a high dreaming premium are 90 percent, or more, likely, to invest in
the PLS. Since the probability of PLS take-up is increasing almost linearly in the
dreaming premium, it is possible to say that this supports the a priori hypothesis
that subjects invest in the PLS because of its lottery-type jackpot payoff. Thus,
combined with the findings in the first section above, it is possible to conclude
that, as hypothesised, the key salient features which determine PLS take-up are
its lottery-type pay-off and a savings element, defined by principal security.
Figure 5.3: The relationship between PLS take-up and the dreaming premium
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5.4 Payment mechanisms and sample selection
This experiment provides two interesting methodological insights. First, there is
no evidence of sample-selection within the $8 and $12 Study Response groups (Ap-
pendix A). Table B.1 further reports that there is no statistically-significant differ-
ence between the savings behaviour of the two Study Response subgroups. Since
subjects in both groups shared similar characteristics and responded to incentives
rationally, results sourced from Study Response are not biased by the different
participation fees (Slonim et al., 2011). Second, interactions between payment
mechanism and savings behaviour are not found to be statistically-significant. Al-
though Table 5.2 indicates that Study Response subjects, who received higher
flat-fees than MTurk subjects and did not have hypothetical experimental payoffs,
save more on average, this difference is no longer statistically-significant when
the explanatory variables include more subject characteristics (Table 5.3). More-
over, the rational responses of the subjects to experimental parameters through-
out the experiment shows that complex online experiments can be internally- and
externally-valid.
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6 Discussion
The effect of specific policies aimed at increasing savings rates is difficult to iso-
late with available field data because savings decisions are highly complex and
dependent on time and risk attitudes, consumption and wealth levels, and other
individual characteristics. In particular, determining the effect of these policies
on individuals’ portfolio allocation requires detailed data which is, at present, not
available in the field. In an experimental setting, however, the effect of policies
designed to increase savings can be modelled. This experiment allows for careful
analysis of a ‘nudge’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) designed to increase savings –
the introduction of the PLS. Individuals’ responses to the change in their choice
set and their total allocation to savings are studied in two main stages. It is thus
possible to collect detailed individual-level data on portfolio allocation and savings
decision in an environment in which parameters are controlled and can be manipu-
lated. Thus, this study provides a key contribution to the literature on increasing
savings among low-income households (see Atalay, 2011, for an overview).
The introduction of PLS significantly increased the level of total savings in this
experiment. On average, subjects allocated 25 percent more of their portfolio to-
wards savings in the form of traditional interest-bearing savings and the PLS. Even
after accounting for the certain interest foregone by subjects when they reallocate
funds from traditional savings to the PLS, the amount of savings available to sub-
jects in ten weeks increased by 20 percent, on average. Analysis of the subject
characteristics suggests that the PLS product appeals more strongly to subjects
who report low levels of savings, and are thus most financially fragile. Subjects
with little or no reported savings were found to bear, on average, a dreaming
premium far higher than subjects with high levels of savings, implying a higher
probability of PLS take-up (Table 5.7 and Figure 5.3). This is consistent with
Figure 5.1, which shows that subjects who reported zero savings increased their
allocation to total savings by 40 percent after the PLS introduction.
These findings are consistent with the a priori hypotheses presented in Section 3.
First, the allocation to current consumption decreases by 38 percent after the PLS
introduction. It follows that novel aspects of the PLS, the combination of skewness
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in the form of a jackpot prize and principal-security, capture a formerly missing
market for savings. Second, the reallocation of the portfolio budget from the lot-
tery indicates that individuals accept the trade-off of lower odds of winning a $1000
jackpot in return for principal-security from a savings product which provides the
utility of dreaming. An analysis of the dreaming premium and its relationship
with PLS take-up supports the hypothesis that lottery ticket buyers invest in the
PLS upon its introduction. Finally, as hypothesised, the allocation to traditional
savings decreases as the PLS provides individuals with a savings option with the
appeal of skewness, which is greater than the appeal of interest. Since the real-
location from current consumption and lottery exceeds that from the traditional
savings, and thus, total savings increase despite the interest foregone.
This study may also be considered part of the literature which uses controlled
experiments to model and empirically analyse complex real-world environments.
Experiments can be used to construct simple model economies in which key vari-
ables can be isolated and observed. In particular, experiments can identify the
effects of new policies, while holding everything else constant (Roth, 2002). In
the market design literature, Kagel and Roth (2000) use a controlled experiment
to clarify the impact of different clearinghouse designs in the market for medical
graduates. Subjects were divided into two conditions – one using a stable deferred-
acceptance algorithm which had been successfully implemented in the field, and
another using an unsuccessful, unstable priority matching algorithm – and a sim-
ple labour market with the key features of the medical market was constructed.
The aim was not to recreate the field markets but to see whether the match-
ing algorithms had the same effect in a controlled environment. Kagel and Roth
were able to qualitatively reproduce the field outcomes under conditions in which
the differences in outcomes could be unambiguously attributed to the matching
algorithm.
Experiments can also be used to generate data regarding the effect of a policy
change when there is insufficient field data. A key recent study provides an out-
standing example of this sort of experiment – Kessler and Roth (Forthcoming),
motivated by low organ donor registration rates in the US, test the effect of a
policy whereby previously-registered donors are given priority on organ waiting-
60
lists (‘priority policy’). Field data on the effect of the priority policy is extremely
limited, and the decision to donate is highly complex and depends on a number of
contentious factors which cannot be measured using field data. Kessler and Roth,
therefore, design a two-stage lab experiment, which allows them to compare donor
registration rates under the baseline policy (‘opt-in’ without priority) and the pri-
ority policy. Their results have striking policy implications – donor registrations
under the priority policy are 2 to 2.5 times higher than the baseline policy. The
parallels between Kessler and Roth’s study and this study are apparent: both are
motivated by existing undesirable welfare outcomes, low donor registration rates
and high levels of financial fragility; and both test the simple changes to the ex-
isting choice architecture, the introduction to the priority policy and the PLS, in
a controlled environment.
Encouraging households to increase their levels of savings is a pressing and difficult
problem. At present, US households are extremely financially vulnerable with half
of the respondents in Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano’s (2011) survey indicating that
they would not be able to cope with a moderate consumption shock of $2000. The
findings above suggest that the introduction of the PLS is a promising incremental
improvement to the choice set that households currently face. PLS has a simple and
broad appeal, and is a solution that might fit well with the existing institutional
structure.
There are other policy options to increase the households’ consumption insurance
and ease their liquidity constraint. The average annual income tax refund, for
example, is approximately $2000 (Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano, 2011). This
relaxes households’ liquidity constraint and could be used to stimulate saving.
However, studies on the use of tax refunds by liquidity-constrained individuals,
for example subprime borrowers, find that loan applications and car sales spike
when tax refunds are paid (Adams, Einav and Levin, 2009). Consumption is also
found to increase sharply on the day Social Security payments are made (Stephens,
2003). Thus, a policy of cash injections to ease liquidity constraints and increase
consumption insurance would likely end up increasing current consumption among
the most financial fragile households.
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Mandates designed to increase savings amongst the most financial fragile house-
holds are likely to be problematic in practice. For savings to be effective con-
sumption insurance, savers must be able to withdraw funds at short notice. An
attempt to limit withdrawals to cases of genuine emergencies would be unworkable
in practice – it would increase the delay between the need for savings and access
to them, thus lowering liquidity – and add result in increased red-tape. Moreover,
implementation of such a policy may also be difficult since it is paternalistic and
increases regulation.35
PLS, on the other hand, is a practical product designed to increase the appeal of
saving. Its salient features, the lottery-style jackpot which offers skewness and
principal-security, are familiar to all savers and are arguably simpler to explain
than compound interest. Importantly, PLS may fill a missing market for savings
as its demand is found to be primarily sourced from decreases in current consump-
tion and lottery tickets. Thus, the introduction of PLS alone encourages more
saving, not just a reallocation of funds from interest-bearing accounts to PLS. It
is also arguably more practical to introduce PLS products than introducing other
measures which increase savings. PLS introduction at present would require a
relaxation in state laws which monopolise the operation of lotteries.36
The findings of this study indicate that the introduction of the PLS is a plausible
mechanism for increasing the level of household savings and decreasing financial
fragility. Its introduction in this experiment increased the total allocation to sav-
ings substantially and, given the lack of field data to measure this effect, it is
possible to infer that the PLS introduction would have a qualitatively similar ef-
fect in practice. Its introduction could help lower the externality imposed by high
levels of financial fragility. As it is an incremental change to the current choice set
faced by households, it is likely that the introduction of PLS in a developed nation
like the US could ‘nudge’ households into saving more and being better equipped
in the event of routine emergencies.
35In addition, Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano (2011) find a correlation between high levels of
financial fragility and negative attitudes towards regulation.
36PLS has been trialled in the Indiana and Michigan as a ‘raﬄe’, which is legally distinct from
a lottery.
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7 Conclusion
The findings of this experiment strongly support the hypothesis that the introduc-
tion of PLS increases savings. The lack of sufficiently detailed field data means
that the simple experiment conducted here is a powerful tool for modelling and
empirically testing the hypothesis. This experiment has a relatively more diverse
panel than a convenient student sample and is framed as an individual portfo-
lio allocation problem. Thus, the validity of this experiment is greater than that
which abstracts away from the portfolio allocation aspect and uses a convenient
student sample in a lab setting. Limited data available from the introduction of
PLS in South Africa also supports the results presented here – the introduction
of PLS resulted in $US200 million being invested in the PLS by 1.1 million South
Africans, many of whom had never had bank accounts. Therefore, although the
response to the PLS introduction in the field may be more muted than the 25
percent increase in allocations to total savings measured here, it is possible to say
that the PLS represents a potentially powerful policy tool to address the financial
fragility of US households.
As with any study, there a number of limitations which can be addressed by
future research. First, it would have been preferable to have conducted this study
over a longer time-horizon than 10 weeks. A longer engagement with subjects
could have allowed researchers to incorporate more features of a bank account into
the traditional savings and PLS decisions. Researchers could have, for example,
tested the demand for funds in savings accounts by allowing subjects to withdraw
funds allocated to savings at any time, thus replicating the liquidity of savings,
at the cost of foregoing further compound interest payments or the chance to win
the PLS jackpot. To test the appeal of skewness, subjects could also have been
asked to readjust their allocations after the first PLS jackpot is won by a subject.
Second, the discretisation of the budget set to options of $0, $20, . . . , $100 in order
to clearly communicate the odds of winning the PLS, is arguably unrealistic and
may overstate the effect of the PLS introduction. A design with a continuous
budget set would provide an important test of robustness for these results. Third,
the current design provides information about the PLS to all subjects. While this
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has the advantage of allowing for within-subject comparison, it may overstate the
effect of PLS introduction due to an experimental demand effect. A study with
a between-subjects design would provide an important test of the robustness of
these results.
Due to the complexity of economic systems outside the controlled environment
of experiments, caution must be exercised when applying inferences drawn from
experiments to the real-world. However, the lack of field data and the advantages
of this online experiment relative to lab studies means that an experiment is an
important tool for modelling and testing hypotheses about savings policy. The
results indicate that the PLS is a plausible policy for increasing the level of savings
and improving on current welfare outcomes. Prize-linked savings could, thus, be
a nudge in the right direction.
64
A Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Summary of subject characteristics
All MTurk Study Response
All $8 group $12 group
N 562 449 113 57 56
Sex
Male 271 213 58 30 28
(0.48) (0.47) (0.51) (0.53) (0.50)
Female 290 236 54 27 27
(0.52) (0.53) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
Born in the USA 522 419 103 52 51
(0.93) (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91)
English as a 545 434 111 56 55
first language (0.97) (0.97) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98)
Age
18–25 years 132 128 4 3 1
(0.23) (0.29) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
26–45 years 293 239 54 31 23
(0.52) (0.53) (0.48) (0.54) (0.41)
46–65 years 125 78 47 20 27
(0.22) (0.17) (0.42) (0.35) (0.48)
Over 65 years 11 4 7 3 4
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Reported savings
$0 73 65 8 5 3
(0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
$1–$200 116 105 11 5 6
(0.21) (0.23) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
$201–$500 53 41 12 8 4
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07)
$501–$1000 60 50 10 3 7
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13)
$1001–$2000 64 50 14 9 5
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(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09)
$2001–$5000 81 63 18 9 9
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
$5001–$10,000 48 33 15 6 9
(0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16)
$10,001–$30,000 34 23 11 6 5
(0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Over $30,000 30 18 12 5 7
(0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13)
Weekly expenditure ($; exc. food, healthcare and housing)
Mean 133.57 128.35 154.08 141.79 170.39
Median 75 70 100 100 100
Minimum 0 0 0 10 0
Maximum 3000 3000 1300 1000 1300
Employment
Full-time 270 177 93 47 46
(0.48) (0.39) (0.82) (0.82) (0.82)
Part-time 98 88 10 6 4
(0.17) (0.20) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07)
Unemployed (not looking 26 25 1 1 0
for work) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Unemployed (currently 79 78 1 0 1
looking for work) (0.14) (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Retired 79 78 1 0 1
(0.14) (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
In School 12 7 5 1 4
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07)
Choose not to work 56 54 2 2 0
(0.10) (0.12) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00)
Education
Did not complete high 6 4 2 2 0
school or equivalent (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00)
High school or equivalent 196 166 30 16 14
(0.35) (0.37) (0.27) (0.28) (0.25)
Bachelor’s degree 232 183 49 24 25
(0.41) (0.41) (0.43) (0.42) (0.45)
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Technical certification 42 32 10 4 6
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11)
Master’s degree 73 55 18 11 7
(0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13)
Doctorate or higher 13 9 4 1 3
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Marital status
Single 267 233 34 19 15
(0.48) (0.52) (0.30) (0.33) (0.27)
Married 247 181 66 33 33
(0.44) (0.40) (0.58) (0.58) (0.59)
Divorced 47 34 13 6 7
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Lottery expenditure
$0 229 196 33 17 16
(0.41) (0.44) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
$1–$25 167 135 32 21 11
(0.30) (0.30) (0.28) (0.37) (0.20)
$26–$75 72 55 17 7 10
(0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.18)
$76–$150 46 29 17 5 12
(0.08) (0.06) (0.15) (0.09) (0.21)
$151–$300 29 21 8 5 3
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Over $300 19 13 6 3 3
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Gambling (frequency)
Once a week or 25 18 7 5 2
more (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04)
Between once a week 41 28 13 5 8
and every month (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14)
Between once a month 77 60 17 7 10
and every six months (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.18)
Between once every six 74 54 20 10 10
months and a year (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Rarely 198 166 32 16 16
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(0.35) (0.37) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
Never 147 123 24 15 9
(0.26) (0.27) (0.21) (0.26) (0.16)
Would they invest into an actual PLS product?
Yes 66 55 11 5 6
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
No 145 124 21 11 10
(0.26) (0.28) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Depends on the 312 239 73 38 35
actual product offered (0.56) (0.53) (0.65) (0.67) (0.63)
Don’t know 38 31 7 3 4
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Comprehension question
Pass 553 444 109 57 52
(0.98) (0.99) (0.96) (1.00) (0.93)
Fail 9 5 4 0 4
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07)
Race/ethnicity
Asian 39 33 6 2 4
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
African-American/Black 38 32 6 6 0
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.00)
Hispanic 21 20 1 1 0
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
White 447 350 97 47 50
(0.80) (0.78) (0.86) (0.82) (0.89)
Other 16 13 3 2 1
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Religion
Catholic 121 86 35 15 20
(0.22) (0.19) (0.31) (0.26) (0.36)
Protestant 147 116 31 15 16
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.29)
Latter-Day Saints 13 12 1 1 0
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
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Christian (Other) 104 80 24 15 9
(0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.26) (0.16)
Jewish 7 6 1 1 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Muslim 4 4 0 0 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other 166 145 21 11 10
(0.30) (0.32) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Religiousity
Once a week or 102 74 28 13 15
more (0.18) (0.16) (0.25) (0.23) (0.27)
Between once a week 49 40 9 4 5
and every month (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
Between once a month 40 31 9 6 3
and every six months (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05)
Between once every six 49 39 10 8 2
months and every year (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.04)
Rarely 145 123 22 9 13
(0.26) (0.27) (0.19) (0.16) (0.23)
Never 177 142 35 18 17
(0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30)
Financial Risk
Very safe
185 154 31 19 12
(0.33) (0.34) (0.27) (0.33) (0.21)
Save 157 121 36 11 25
(0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.19) (0.45)
Neutral 106 78 28 17 11
(0.19) (0.17) (0.25) (0.30) (0.20)
Risky 35 27 8 5 3
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Very risky 5 3 2 1 1
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No savings or investments 72 65 7 4 3
(0.13) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
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Patience
Very patient 124 99 25 8 17
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.14) (0.30)
Somewhat patient 240 194 46 23 23
(0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Neutral 74 60 14 9 5
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09)
Somewhat impatient 106 80 26 16 10
(0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.28) (0.18)
Very impatient 16 15 1 1 0
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Social rank perception
Much better off 22 14 8 2 6
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11)
Somewhat better off 111 83 28 14 14
(0.20) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
About the same as others 205 159 46 26 20
(0.36) (0.35) (0.41) (0.46) (0.36)
Somewhat worse off 179 152 27 13 14
(0.32) (0.34) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25)
Much worse off 44 41 3 2 1
(0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Proportion of sample or subsample in parentheses.
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B Additional Results Tables
Table B.1 presents a comparison of the savings behaviour of the $8 and $12 Study
Response subgroups. The regression is conducted using the Study Response
group only, and SR12i = 1 when a subject is in the $12 subgroup. Otherwise,
the regression equation is identical to (5.3).
Table B.2 provides OLS estimates in addition to the tobit and ordered probit
estimates presented in Table 5.5.
Table B.3 provides estimates additional to Table 5.3 for the full set of subject
characteristics.
Table B.4 provides estimates additional to Table 5.6 for the full set of subject
characteristics.
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Table B.1: Comparing Study Response subgroups’ savings behaviour
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
OLS xi × SR12i Tobit† xi × SR12i
$12 Study Response subject -3.188 -6.017
(0.620) (0.582)
PLS introduced 8.292∗∗ 1.497 13.88∗∗ 0.159
(0.005) (0.708) (0.006) (0.981)
Fair PLS odds 0.317 -1.818 -0.337 -1.880
(0.769) (0.302) (0.856) (0.560)
Good PLS odds 2.103 -0.895 2.202 0.283
(0.061) (0.604) (0.226) (0.926)
Fair lottery odds -0.079 0.148 -0.942 0.530
(0.952) (0.940) (0.683) (0.882)
Good lottery odds -3.115 2.023 -6.017 4.086
(0.130) (0.397) (0.092) (0.335)
10% interest rate 3.350 0.334 4.410 1.221
(0.235) (0.924) (0.328) (0.838)
20% interest rate 9.881∗ -6.255 15.91∗ -10.250
(0.014) (0.199) (0.019) (0.222)
Constant 46.55∗∗∗ 48.66∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2712 2717
Subjects 113 113
Adjusted R2 0.017
Pseudo R2 0.003
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Values truncated at $0 and $100. Marginal effects reported.
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Table B.2: Effect of PLS introduction on portfolio allocations (OLS)
(1) (2) (2)
Current consumption Traditional Savings Lottery tickets
PLS introduced 7.506∗ -4.960∗∗∗ -4.858∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Fair PLS odds 0.340 -1.253∗∗ -0.178
(0.385) (0.003) (0.580)
Good PLS odds 0.057 -2.434∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗
(0.902) (0.000) (0.040)
Fair lottery odds -2.327∗∗∗ -0.763 3.060∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.054) (0.000)
Good lottery odds -3.115∗∗∗ -3.168∗∗∗ 5.892∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
10% interest -7.222∗∗∗ 10.741∗∗∗ -1.442∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
20% interest -14.004∗∗∗ 19.555∗∗∗ -3.541∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean allocations before PLS 31.49 48.09 20.42
Observations 13488 13488 13488
Subjects 562 562 562
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.603 0.526
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.4: Analysis of demographics and the dreaming premium (all character-
istics)
(1) (2)
OLS Tobit†
Study Response subject 7.506∗ 8.429∗
(0.018) (0.029)
Age -0.0732 -0.122
(0.493) (0.363)
Born in the USA -8.270∗ -9.774
(0.049) (0.061)
English speaker 4.545 2.631
(0.389) (0.671)
Employed 5.486∗ 7.316∗
(Omitted: Unemployed/NiLF) (0.013) (0.010)
Expressed interest in PLS 10.71∗∗ 12.85∗∗
(0.003) (0.001)
Male 1.560 1.905
(0.469) (0.476)
Single -0.0626 -0.0627
(Omitted: married) (0.980) (0.984)
Education -0.0449 0.0444
(years) (0.884) (0.908)
Gambling 0.0655 0.0318
(frequency) (0.501) (0.783)
Financial risk -1.619 -1.967
(1:very safe – 5: very risky) (0.146) (0.155)
Lottery expenditure 5.731∗∗∗ 7.662∗∗∗
($ 00s) (0.000) (0.000)
Patience -0.497 -0.886
77
(1: very patient – 5: very impatient) (0.740) (0.631)
Religious activity 0.0654 0.0667
(frequency) (0.343) (0.427)
Reported savings -0.577∗∗∗ -0.891∗∗∗
($ 000s) (0.000) (0.000)
Social rank perception 1.602 1.691
(1: much better off – 5: much worse off) (0.186) (0.280)
Weekly expenditure 0.000391 -0.00157
($; exc. food, healthcare and housing) (0.927) (0.782)
Race/Ethnicity (Omitted: Other race)
Asian-American -2.700 -2.971
(0.684) (0.728)
Black/African-American -2.826 -2.583
(0.665) (0.755)
Hispanic 8.561 10.60
(0.311) (0.282)
White -0.460 -1.055
(0.936) (0.886)
Religion (Omitted: Other religion)
Catholic 0.153 1.593
(0.960) (0.671)
Protestant 1.840 3.137
(0.563) (0.438)
Latter-Day Saints 2.235 2.727
(0.807) (0.806)
Christian (Other) 3.823 5.712
(0.279) (0.181)
Jewish 0.0813 -1.352
(0.991) (0.885)
78
Muslim 7.163 10.56
(0.650) (0.529)
Constant 25.27∗ 23.97
(0.029) (0.098)
Observations 562 562
Adjusted R2 0.116
Pseudo R2 0.023
p-values in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Values truncated at 0 and 100. Marginal effects reported.
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